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Market structureI present amodel that analyzes the coexistence of formal and informalﬁnance in underdeveloped creditmarkets.
Formal banks have access to unlimited funds but are unable to control the use of credit. Informal lenders can pre-
vent non-diligent behavior but often lack the needed capital. The theory implies that formal and informal credit
can be either complements or substitutes. Themodel also explainswhyweak legal institutions increase the prev-
alence of informal ﬁnance in some markets and reduce it in others, why ﬁnancial market segmentation persists,
and why informal interest rates can be highly variable within the same sub-economy.
© 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Formal and informal ﬁnance coexist in markets with weak legal in-
stitutions and low levels of income (Germidis et al., 1991; Nissanke
and Aryeetey, 1998). Poor people either obtain informal credit or bor-
row from both ﬁnancial sectors at the same time. Banerjee and Duﬂo
(2007) document that 95% of all borrowers living below $2 a day in
Hyderabad, India access informal sources even when banks are
present.1 Meanwhile, Das-Gupta et al. (1989) provide evidence from
Delhi, India where 70% of all borrowers get credit from both sectors atThailand.
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School of Economics, Swedishthe same time.2 Such ﬁnancing arrangements raise a number of issues.
Why do some borrowers take informal loans despite the existence of
formal banks, while others obtain funds from both ﬁnancial sectors
simultaneously? Also, is there a causal link between institutional devel-
opment, level of income, and informal lending? If so, precisely what is
the connection?
Although empirically important, the coexistence of formal and infor-
mal ﬁnance has not received as much attention as recent theoretical
work on microﬁnance (Banerjee et al., 1994; Ghatak and Guinnane,
1999; Rai and Sjöström, 2004). In this paper, I provide a theory of infor-
mal ﬁnance, whose main assumptions can be summarized as follows.
First, in linewith the literature on the effect of institutions on economic
performance (Djankov et al., 2007; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Visaria,
2009), I view legal protection of banks as essential to ensure availability
of credit. To this end, I assume that borrowers may divert their bank loan
(ex ante moral hazard) and that weaker contract enforcement increases
the valueof suchdiversion,which limits the supplyof funds. By contrast, in-
formal lenders are able to monitor borrowers by offering credit to a group
of known clients where social ties and social sanctions induce investment
(Aleem, 1990; Ghate et al., 1992; Udry, 1990).3
Second, while banks have access to unlimited funds, informal
lenders can be resource constrained. In a survey of ﬁnancial markets2 See Conning (2001) and Giné (2011) for related support from Chile and Thailand.
3 For further evidence of the personal character of informal lending see Udry (1994),
Steel et al. (1997), and La Ferrara (2003) for the case of Africa and Bell (1990) for the case
of Asia. As in Besley and Coate (1995), my aim is not to explain informal lenders' monitor-
ing ability, but to understand its implications.
cense.
6 See Banerjee (2003) for a discussion of the similarity across different moral hazard
models of credit rationing.
7 While Kranton and Banerjee and Newman focus on how market imperfections give
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intermediationmay be held up not for lack of locally informed agents…
but for lack of local intermediary capital” (Conning and Udry, 2007,
p. 2892). Consequently, landlords, professional moneylenders, shop-
keepers, and traders who offer informal credit frequently acquire bank
funds to service borrowers' ﬁnancing needs. Ghate et al. (1992), Rahman
(1992), and Irfan et al. (1999) remark that formal credit totals three quar-
ters of the informal sector's liabilities in many Asian countries.4
Third, less developed economies are often characterized as uncom-
petitive. In particular, formal sector banks typically have some market
power (see Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2004 for contemporary support
and Rajan and Ramcharan, 2011; Wang, 2008 for historical evidence).5
Within this framework, I show that informal ﬁnance affects poor
people's access to credit in two main ways. In the model, formal banks
are restrained by borrowers' inability to commit to using funds for pro-
ductive purposes. The agency problem is more acute for the poor as the
beneﬁt of diversion increases in the size of the loan. While informal
lenders' monitoring advantage allows them to lend to bank-rationed
borrowers they may not have the necessary resources in which case
they also turn to the formal sector for additional funds.
A ﬁrst set of ﬁndings considers how informal credit may improve
borrowers' relationship with the banks. Informal loans increase the re-
turn to productive activities as they cannot be diverted. This lowers
the relative gain of misusing formal funds, allowing banks to extend
more credit. Informal ﬁnance thus complements the banks by permit-
ting for larger formal loans to poor borrowers.
Second, informal lenders' monitoring ability also helps banks to re-
duce agency cost by letting them channel formal credit through the in-
formal sector.When lending directly to poor people, banks share part of
the surplus with the borrowers to keep them from diverting. Extending
credit through informal lenders that are rich enough to have a stake in
the outcomeminimizes the surplus that banks need to share. In contrast
to the ﬁrst result, the credit market becomes segmented as informal ﬁ-
nance substitutes for banks and limits borrowers' direct bank access.
I ﬁnd that the extent to which informal ﬁnance complements or
substitutes for bank credit depends on banks' bargaining power. If
formal banks are competitive, borrowers obtain capital from both ﬁ-
nancial sectors, with poor informal lenders accessing banks for extra
funds. By contrast, if formal lenders have some market power, sufﬁ-
ciently rich (bank-ﬁnanced) informal lenders are borrowers' only
source of credit. This is because borrowers' and informal lenders'
joint return is maximized if both take competitive bank loans,
while bank market power and subsequent credit market segmenta-
tion allows the formal monopoly to reduce agency costs.
The predictions are broadly consistent with existing data on formal–
informal sector interactions. (See Section 5 for an extensive discussion.)
The characterization of the aggregate demand for and supply of formal
and informal credit also allows me to address some additional issues.
For example,weaker legal institutions increase the prevalence of informal
credit if borrowers obtain money from both ﬁnancial sectors, while the
opposite is true if informal lenders supply all capital. Moreover, the inter-
est rates of informal lenders rise as credit markets become segmented.
Persistence of ﬁnancial underdevelopment, in the form of market
segmentation, can also be understood within the model. Wealthier in-
formal lenders (and banks) prefer the segmented outcome that arises4 Conning andUdry (2007) furtherwrite that “the trader-intermediary usually employs
a combination of her own equity together with funds leveraged from less informed out-
side intermediaries such as banks…[leading] to the development of a system of bills of ex-
change…[used by the] outside creditor…as security” (Conning and Udry, 2007, pp. 2863–
2864). See Harriss (1983), Bouman and Houtman (1988), Graham et al. (1988), Floro and
Yotopoulos (1991), and Mansuri (2006) for additional evidence of informal lenders
accessing the formal sector in India, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, and Sri Lanka. See also
Haney (1914), Gates (1977), Biggs (1991), Toby (1991), Teranishi (2005, 2007), and
Wang (2008) for historical support from Japan, Taiwan, and the United States.
5 Beck et al. report a positive and signiﬁcant relation betweenmeasures of bank compe-
tition and GDP per capita.with bank market power, as it softens competition between the ﬁnan-
cial sectors. Finally, my analysis sheds some light on credit market pol-
icy by distinguishing between the efﬁciency effects of wealth transfers,
credit subsidies, and legal reform.
The paper relates to several strands of the literature. First, it adds to
work that views informal lenders either as bank competitors (Bell et al.,
1997; Jain, 1999; Jain and Mansuri, 2003) or as a channel of bank funds
(Bose, 1998; Floro and Ray, 1997; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998). While these
papers share the notion that informal lenders hold a monitoring advan-
tage over banks, there are a number of important differences. First, in
earlier work it is not clear whether informal lenders compete with
banks or primarily engage in channeling funds. Second, competition
theories cannot account for bank lending to the informal sector. Third,
channeling theories fail to address the agency problembetween the for-
mal and the informal lender.
The present paper explainswhy informal lenders take bank credit in
each of these instances, making competition and channeling a choice
variable in a framework where monitoring problems exist between
banks, informal lenders, and borrowers. Allowing for both competition
and channeling thus extends and reconciles existing approaches. By de-
riving endogenous constraints on informal lending, I am able to account
for the empirical regularity that informal credit complements as well as
substitutes for formal ﬁnance.
Finally, an advantage over earlier work is the tractability of the
basic agency model which delivers the simple insight that less lever-
aged borrowers are better credit risks (as in the costly effort setup).6
The framework presented is well suited to take on additional character-
istics relevant to understand formal and informal sector interactions
such as differences in enforcement capacity, the importance of legal in-
stitutions, and market power; features which are missing in earlier
contributions.
The second line of related literature studies the interaction between
modern and traditional sectors to rationalize persistence of personal ex-
change (Banerjee and Newman, 1998; Besley et al., 2012; Kranton,
1996; Rajan, 2009).7 My results also match Biais and Mariotti's (2009)
and von Lilienfeld-Toal et al.'s (2012) ﬁndings of heterogeneous effects
of improved creditor rights across rich and poor agents. Finally, the
paper links to research emphasizing market structure as an important
cause of contractual frictions in less developed economies (Kranton
and Swamy, 2008; Mookherjee and Ray, 2002; Petersen and Rajan,
1995).8
Themodel builds on Burkart and Ellingsen's (2004) analysis of trade
credit in a competitive banking and input supplier market.9 The bank
and the borrower in their model are analogous to the competitive for-
mal lender and the borrower inmy setting. However, their input suppli-
er and my informal lender differ substantially.10 Also, in contrast to
Burkart and Ellingsen, by considering credit-rationed informal lenders
and bank market power, the model distinguishes whether informal
lenders competewith banks or engage in channeling formal bank funds.
Section 2 introduces the model and Section 3 presents equilibrium
outcomes. Section 4 deals with cross-sectional predictions, persistencerise to institutions that (may) impede the development of markets, Besley et al. and Rajan
(like this paper) show how rent protection can hamper reform.
8 As in Petersen and Rajan andMookherjee and Ray, I study the effects of market power
on credit availability, while Kranton and Swamy investigate the implications on hold-up
between exporters and textile producers.
9 Burkart and Ellingsen assume that it is less proﬁtable for the borrower to divert inputs
than to divert cash. Thus, input suppliers may lend when banks are limited due to poten-
tial agency problems.
10 While the input supplier and the (competitive) bank offer a simple debt contract, the
informal lender offers a more sophisticated project-speciﬁc contract, where the invest-
ment and the subsequent repayment are determined using Nash Bargaining.More impor-
tantly, the informal lender is assumed to be able to ensure that investment is guaranteed,
something that the trade creditor is unable to do.
159A. Madestam / Journal of Development Economics 107 (2014) 157–174ofmarket segmentation, and informal interest rates. Section 5 examines
empirical evidence. Section 6 explores economic policy. I conclude by
discussing robustness issues and point to possible extensions. Formal
proofs are in the Appendix.14 As showed by Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), this restriction is without loss of general-
ity as no other contract can upset an equilibrium in overdraft facilities.
15 This is in contrast to Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), who assume that banks and trade2. Model
Consider a credit market consisting of risk-neutral entrepreneurs
(for example, farmers, households, or small ﬁrms), banks (who provide
formal ﬁnance), and moneylenders (who provide informal ﬁnance).
The entrepreneur is endowed with observable wealth ωE ≥ 0. She has
access to a deterministic production function, Q (I), where I is the in-
vestment volume. The production function is concave, twice continu-
ously differentiable, and satisﬁes Q (0) = 0 and Q′ (0) = ∞. In a
perfect credit market with interest rate r, the entrepreneur would like
to attain ﬁrst-best investment given by Q′(I⁎) = 1 + r. However, she
lacks sufﬁcient wealth, ωE b I⁎ (r), and thus turns to the bank and/or
the moneylender for the remaining funds.11
While banks have an excess supply of funds, credit is limited as the
entrepreneur is unable to commit to invest all available resources into
her project. Speciﬁcally, I assume that she may use (part of) the assets
to generate nonveriﬁable private beneﬁts. Non-diligent behavior
resulting in diversion of funds denotes any activity that is less productive
than investment, for example, using available resources for consumption
or ﬁnancial saving. The diversion activity yields beneﬁt ϕ b 1 for every
unit diverted. Creditor vulnerability is captured by ϕ (where a higher ϕ
implies weaker legal protection of banks). While investment is unveriﬁ-
able, the outcome of the entrepreneur's project in terms of output and/or
sales revenuemay be veriﬁed. The entrepreneur thus faces the following
trade-off: either she invests and realizes the net beneﬁt of production
after repaying the bank (and possibly the moneylender), or she proﬁts
directly from diverting the bank funds (the entrepreneur still pays the
moneylender if she has taken an informal loan). In the case of partial di-
version, any remaining returns are repaid to the bank in full. The bank
does not to derive any beneﬁt from resources that are diverted.
Informal lenders are endowed with observable wealth ωM ≥ 0 and
have a monitoring advantage over banks such that credit granted is
fully invested. To keep themodel tractable, I restrict informal lenders' oc-
cupational choice to lending (additional sources of income do not alter
the main insights). For simplicity, monitoring cost is assumed to zero.12
The moneylender's superior knowledge of local borrowers grants him
exclusivity (but not necessarily market power, see below).13 In the
absence of contracting problems between the moneylender and the en-
trepreneur, the moneylender maximizes the joint surplus derived from
the investment project and divides the proceeds using Nash Bargaining.
A contract is given by apair (B,R)∈ℝ+2 ,where B is the amount borrowed
by the entrepreneur and R the repayment obligation. Finally, if the mon-
eylender requires additional funding he turns to a bank.
Following the same logic as above, I assume that the moneylender
cannot commit to lend his bank loan and that diversion yields private
beneﬁts equivalent ofϕ b 1 for every unit diverted.While lending is un-
veriﬁable, the outcome of themoneylender's operationmay be veriﬁed.
The moneylender thus faces the following trade-off: either he lends the
bank credit to the entrepreneur, realizing the net-lending proﬁt after
compensating the bank, or he beneﬁts directly from diverting the
bank loan.11 I assume that the entrepreneur accepts the ﬁrst available contract if indifferent be-
tween the contracts offered.
12 This is not to diminish the importance of informal lenders' monitoring cost (see
Banerjee, 2003). However, the cost is set to zero as it makes no difference in the analysis
that follows (unless sufﬁciently prohibitive to prevent banks or entrepreneurs from deal-
ing with the informal sector altogether).
13 The assumption that borrowers obtain funds from at most one informal source has
empirical support see, for example, Aleem (1990), Siamwalla et al. (1990), and
Berensmann et al. (2002).Banks have access to unlimited funds at a constant unit cost of zero.
They offer a contract (Li, Di), where Li is the loan and Di the interest pay-
ment, with subscripts i∈ {E,M} indicating entrepreneur (E) andmoney-
lender (M). When ϕ is equal to zero, legal protection of banks is perfect
and even a penniless entrepreneur and/or moneylender could raise an
amount supporting ﬁrst-best investment. To make the problem inter-
esting, I assume that
ϕNϕ ≡ Q I
 0ð Þð Þ−I 0ð Þ
I 0ð Þ : ð1Þ
In words, the marginal beneﬁt of diversion yields higher utility than
the average rate of return to ﬁrst-best investment at zero rate of interest
[henceforth I⁎ (0) = I⁎].
In the competitive benchmark case, I follow Burkart and Ellingsen
(2004) by assuming that formal banks offer overdraft facilities of the
form LE; 1þ rð ÞLEð Þf gLE ≤ LE , where LE is the loan, (1 + r) LE the repay-
ment, and LE the credit limit. The contract implies that a borrower
may withdraw any amount of funds until the credit limit binds.14
To distinguish formal from informal ﬁnance, I assume that banks are
unable to condition their contracts on the moneylender's contract offer,
an assumption empirically supported byGiné (2011).15 If not, the entre-
preneur could obtain an informal loan and then approach the bank.
Bank credit would then depend on the informal loan and the subse-
quent certain investment.16 The timing is as follows:
1. Banks offer a contract, (Li, Di), to the entrepreneur and the money-
lender, respectively.
2. Themoneylender offers a contract, (B, R), to the entrepreneur, where
R is settled through Nash Bargaining.
3. The moneylender makes his lending/diversion decision.
4. The entrepreneur makes her investment/diversion decision.
5. Repayments are made.
Note ﬁnally that the informal sector contains a variety of lenders in-
cluding input suppliers, landlords, merchants, professional money-
lenders, and traders. Through their occupation, they attract different
borrowers (for example, trader/farmer and landlord/tenant) that may
give some lenders a particular enforcement advantage. The important
and uniting feature, however, is the ability to induce diligent behavior
irrespective of the quality of the legal system. In the analysis that fol-
lows, the moneylender represents all informal lenders with this trait.
3. Equilibrium
I begin by analyzing each ﬁnancial sector in isolation. This helps un-
derstand how the agency problem in the formal bankmarket generates
credit rationing. It also highlights how the provision of incentives and
the quality of the legal system affect lending across the two sectors.
3.1. Benchmark
There is free entry in the bank market. Following a Bertrand argu-
ment, competition drives equilibrium bank proﬁt to zero.17 Nonetheless,credit suppliers offer simultaneous contracts. Allowing the informal sector to contract on
the bank provides informal lenders amore active intermediary role, similar to themonitor
in hierarchical agency (principal–monitor–agent) models. See Mookherjee (2012) for an
overview of this literature.
16 See also Bell et al. (1997) for evidence in support of the assumed sequence of events.
17 Some developing credit markets have a sizable share of state-owned banks. I make no
assumption on bank ownership but do assume that proﬁt maximization governs bank be-
havior. While state ownership can be less efﬁcient (La Porta et al., 2002) this does not bar
proﬁt maximization as a useful approximation. In Sapienza's (2004) study of Italian banks,
state-owned enterprises charge less but increase interest rates when markets become
more concentrated, consistent with proﬁt-maximizing behavior.
19 Excess moneylender funds are deposited in the bank earning a zero rate of interest.
20 The rationale is that only threats that are credible will have an effect on the outcomes.
The outside options are only used as constraints on the range of the validity of the Nash
Bargaining solution,with the disagreement point placed on the impasse point (ωE, B). That
is, the entrepreneur can only threaten to proceedwith her stand-alone investment, or deal
herself out of the bargaining, if it gives her a bigger pay-off than dealing herself in. See
Sutton (1986) for a further discussion of how to specify the outside option in non-
cooperative bargaining models.
21 From concavity and Q′(I) ≥ 1 it follows that eα∈ 0;1ð Þ.
22 Informal ﬁnance has been documented as competitive (Adams et al., 1984), monopo-
listically competitive (Aleem, 1990), and as a monopoly (Bhaduri, 1977).
23 Since returns are claimed by the bank even if the bank's credit has been diverted, it is
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see this, suppose ﬁrst that the entrepreneur abstains from diversion.
She then draws on the overdraft facility up to the point LEu, where
LuE ¼ min I rð Þ−ωE; LE
 
: ð2Þ
Either the entrepreneur borrows and invests efﬁciently, I⁎ (r), or
she exhausts the credit limit extended by the bank, LE . In the case
when the entrepreneur intends to divert resources, the return from
diversion is ϕ (ωE + LE − I). If she plans to repay the loan in full
while diverting, the investment yields at least 1 + r on every dollar
of the available assets, which exceeds the diversion beneﬁt of
ϕ b 1. By contrast, if the entrepreneur invests an amount not sufﬁ-
cient to repay in full, there is no reason to invest either borrowed,
LE, or internal funds, ωE, since the bank would claim all of the returns
upon default.18 Hence (solving for the subgame-perfect equilibrium
outcome), the entrepreneur chooses the amount of funds to invest, I,
and the amount of credit, LE, by maximizing
UE ¼ max 0;Q Ið Þ− 1þ rð ÞLEf g
subject to
Q Ið Þ− 1þ rð ÞLE≥ϕ ωE þ LE
 
;
ωE þ LE≥ I;
LE≥LE:
The objective function shows the proﬁt from investing, accounting
for limited liability. The ﬁrst constraint is the incentive-compatibility
condition versus the bank, which prevents the entrepreneur from di-
verting the internal funds as well as the maximum credit raised. The
second condition requires that investment cannot exceed available
funds, while the third inequality states that bank borrowing is
constrained by the credit limit. In sum, the entrepreneur acts diligently
if the contract satisﬁes
Q ωE þ LuE
 
− 1þ rð ÞLuE≥ϕ ωE þ LE
 
; ð3Þ
where LEu is given by Eq. (2). As there is no default in equilibrium, the
only equilibrium interest rate consistent with zero proﬁt is r = 0.
At low wealth, the temptation to divert resources is too large to
allow a loan in support of ﬁrst best. In this case, the credit limit is
given by the binding incentive constraint
Q ωE þ LE
 
−LE ¼ ϕ ωE þ LE
 
: ð4Þ
As an increase in wealth improves the return to investment for a
given loan size, the credit line and the investment risewithwealth. Sim-
ilarly, better creditor protection (a lower ϕ) increases the opportunity
costs of diversion, making larger repayment obligations and thus higher
credit limits incentive compatible. When the entrepreneur is sufﬁcient-
ly wealthy the constraint no longer binds and the ﬁrst-best outcome is
obtained.
Proposition 1. For all ϕ N ϕ there is a thresholdωEc N 0 such that entre-
preneurs with wealth belowωEc invest I b I⁎, credit (LE) and investment
(I) increase in ωE and decrease in creditor vulnerability (ϕ). If ωE ≥ ωEc
then I⁎ is invested.
If the entrepreneur borrows from the informal sector, themoneylend-
er maximizes the surplus of the investment project, Q (ωE + B) − B.
Let B⁎ denote the loan size that solves the ﬁrst-order condition
Q′(ωE + B) − 1 ≥ 0, where B⁎ = min{I⁎ − ωE, ωM}. Absent
contracting frictions, the efﬁcient outcome is obtained if the money-
lender is sufﬁciently wealthy, while the outcome is constrained18 Because output is observable, the bank captures any return from production.efﬁcient otherwise.19 Given B⁎, the entrepreneur and the money-
lender bargain over how to share the project gains using available re-
sources ωE + B. If they disagree, investment fails and each party is
left with her/his wealth or potential loan. The assets represent the
disagreement point of each respective agent. By remaining liquid
throughout the bargaining they can start the project if they agree
or decide to stop negotiating and take their wealth to pursue other
alternatives. In case of agreement, the moneylender offers a contract
where the equilibrium repayment, using the Nash Bargaining solu-
tion, is
R Bð Þ ¼ argmax Q ωE þ Bð Þ−t−ωEf gα t−Bf g1−α
¼ 1−αð Þ Q ωE þ Bð Þ−ωE½  þ αB;
where α represents the degree of competition in the informal sector
(competition increases if α is high). Following Binmore et al. (1986)
and Binmore et al. (1989), I assume that the entrepreneur's option
of investing her own money only becomes a constraint when her
share of the bargaining outcome is less than the value of pursuing
the project on her own.20 For simplicity, α satisﬁes αN eα, where eα
solves
α Q ωE þ Bð Þ−B½  þ 1−αð ÞωE ¼ Q ωEð Þ; ð5Þ
withα∈ eα;1ð Þ.21 The left-hand side of the equality is the entrepreneur's
utility of borrowing from the moneylender, while the right-hand side
denotes the value of the stand-alone investment. As the empirical evi-
dence on the extent of informal lenders' market power is inconclusive,
no a priori assumption is made on α other than that.22
3.2. Formal and informal ﬁnance
Financial sector coexistence not only allows poor borrowers to raise
funds from two sources, but it also permits informal lenders to access
banks. This introduces additional trade-offs. On the one hand, (agen-
cy-free) informal credit improves the incentives of the entrepreneur
as informal ﬁnance increases the residual return to the entrepreneur's
project, with the end effect equivalent to a boost in internal funds. On
the other hand, banks now have to consider the possibility of diversion
on part of the entrepreneur and the moneylender.
Solving backwards and starting with the entrepreneur's incentive
constraint yields
Q ωE þ LuE þ B
 
−LuE−R Bð Þ≥ϕ ωE þ LE
 
; ð6Þ
where LuE ¼ min I∗−ωE−B; LE
 
. The only modiﬁcation from above is
that the amount borrowed from the moneylender, B, is prudently
invested.23
If the moneylender needs extra funds, he turns to a bank and
chooses the amount to lend to the entrepreneur, B, and the amount of
credit, LM, to satisfy the following incentive constraint
R ωM þ LuM
 
−LuM≥ϕ ωM þ LM
 
; ð7Þnever optimal for the entrepreneur to borrow from themoneylenderwhile diverting bank
funds.
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pair (LMu , ωM), with L
u
M ¼ min I∗−ωM−ωE−LuE ; LM
 
. The left-hand side
of the inequality is the moneylender's net-lending proﬁt, while the
right-hand side is the return from borrowing a maximum amount and
then diverting all available assets.24
It remains to determine the repayment using the Nash Bargaining
solution. As before, I have
R Bð Þ ¼ 1−αð Þ Q ωE þ LuE þ B
 
−LuE−ωE
 þ αB; ð8Þ
the only difference is that each party is compensated for the cost of
bank borrowing. I now characterize the resulting equilibrium
constellations.
Poor entrepreneurs and poor moneylenders will be credit rationed
by the bank as their stake in the ﬁnancial outcome is too small. Since
the surplus of the bank transaction accrues entirely to the entrepreneur
and the moneylender, the residual return to investment increases if
both take bank credit. Speciﬁcally, the entrepreneur exhausts her bank
credit line and borrows the maximum amount made available by the
moneylender. Similarly, the moneylender utilizes all available bank
funds and his own capital to service the entrepreneur. Hence, the credit
limits solve the following binding constraints of the entrepreneur and
the moneylender
α Q Ið Þ−LE−LM−ωM
 þ 1−αð ÞωE ¼ ϕ ωE þ LE  ð9Þ
and
1−αð Þ Q Ið Þ−LE−LM−ωE
 þ αωM ¼ ϕ ωM þ LM ; ð10Þ
with I ¼ ωE þ LE þωM þ LM . With ﬁnancial sector coexistence I
make the additional assumption that α satisﬁesαN α^. The threshold,
α^N0, denotes the point of indifference between exclusive bank bor-
rowing and obtaining bank and moneylender funds and is deter-
mined by
α Q Ið Þ−LE−LM−ωM
 þ 1−αð ÞωE ¼ Q ωE þ LE −LE: ð11Þ
25
When the moneylender becomes wealthier, the net return from ex-
tending a loan exceeds the diversion gain, and his incentive constraint
becomes slack. As the moneylender borrows at marginal cost, competi-
tion with the formal bank sector implies that he makes zero proﬁt.26
Hence, the entrepreneur's credit limit solves independent of the
bargaining outcome
Q ωE þ LE þωM þ LM
 
−LE−LM−ωM ¼ ϕ ωE þ LE
 
; ð12Þ24 Similar to the entrepreneur, the moneylender faces a binary choice. If he decides to
lend all his bank funds in order to repay in full, he earns at least 1, while diversion grants
him only ϕ. If he lends too little to repay the bank loan in full, he may as well divert all
funds, since additional returns are claimed by the bank.
25 Note that Eq. (11) implies that remainingwith the bank and themoneylender is utility
equivalent to leaving the bargaining and taking the assets,ωE, to pursue a stand-alone in-
vestment with the bank. Hence, the credit limit that solves Eq. (4) above also has to satisfy
Eqs. (9) and (10) for α ¼ α^.
26 Themore detailed argumentwhy themoneylender earns a zero proﬁt is based on con-
tradiction and goes as follows: suppose there exist a project surplus that exceeds the sum
of the entrepreneur's and the moneylender's outside option and the moneylender keeps
part of the surplus. The bank can then offer the entrepreneurmore credit which increases
her value of diversion and reduces the surplus sharedwith themoneylender. If the surplus
is positive, the entrepreneur refrains from diversion in equilibrium, while themoneylend-
er concedes by lowering his price of credit. This is because the entrepreneur never takes
informal credit while diverting bank funds, as additional returns are claimed by the bank.
The process continues until themoneylender obtains his outside option, contradicting the
initial claim.while the investment is given by I = I⁎.27 If the moneylender is rich
enough to self ﬁnance large parts (or the entire amount) of ﬁrst best
he no longer acquires bank funds. Here the entrepreneur borrows
from a bank and a self-ﬁnanced moneylender. The entrepreneur's in-
centive constraint is still determined by Eq. (12), with LM + ωM re-
placed by B ≤ ωM and I = I⁎.28 Finally, a sufﬁciently rich entrepreneur
resorts to the bank alone, with I = I⁎.
Proposition 2. For all αN α^, ϕNϕ, and:
(i) ωE b ωEc, entrepreneurs borrow from a bank and a bank-ﬁnanced





Entrepreneurs borrow from a bank and a self-ﬁnanced money-
lender and invest I⁎ if ωM≥ωcM;
(ii) ωE ≥ ωEc , entrepreneurs borrow exclusively from a bank and
invest I⁎.
When weak institutions constrain banks, informal ﬁnance allows
poor borrowers (with wealth below ωEc) to invest more than if banks
were the only source of funds. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs with wealth
aboveωEc are unaffected as they can satisfy their needs with bank credit
alone. To better understand how the informal sector's asset base mat-
ters, I explore how the credit lines change with the underlying
parameters.
Corollary 1. For αN α^, ωE b ωEc, and:
(i) ωMbωcM , credit LE
 
increases in entrepreneurs' wealth (ωE),
decreases in creditor vulnerability (ϕ), and is nondecreasing in
moneylenders' wealth (ωM), while LM is nondecreasing in ωE,
decreases in ϕ, and increases in ωM;




), LE increases in ωE, is independent of ωM, and
decreases in ϕ, while LM decreases in ωi and increases in ϕ.
A rise in wealth allows poor entrepreneurs and poor moneylenders
to take additional bank credit if they share the project's surplus [wealth
below ωcM and ωE
c and α∈ α^;1ð Þ]. In particular, a boost in moneylender
wealth makes the entrepreneur's investment of a given bank loan
more valuable than the diversion of the loan, inducing an increase in
the entrepreneur's bank credit. Fig. 1 illustrates how the credit lines
respond to changes in the informal lender's capital base (assuming the
entrepreneur is rationed by the bank). As ωM increases so does bank
credit extended to both the entrepreneur and themoneylender. The re-
sult hinges on the informal sector's ability to enforce the transaction, not
on being better at attracting bank funds. Indeed, worse legal protection
raises the proﬁtability of diversion relative to lending the bank credit,
limiting the moneylender's bank access. At ﬁrst best [attained at ωcM in
Fig. 1], additional informal sector wealth becomes less important as a
higher ωM has no effect on the entrepreneur's incentives (depicted by
the constant LE for ωM≥ωcM).29 Unlike above, weaker legal institutions
increase the importance of the informal sector as diversion no longer
tempts the moneylender (LM increases in ϕ). Since sufﬁciently rich
moneylenders earn the opportunity cost of funds, informal sector
market power only matters at wealth below ωcM and ωE
c . Although
equilibrium outcomes remain the same for α^bα≤1, some variation27 The entrepreneur's credit limit cannot be lower in equilibrium. Otherwise, there
would exist a bank contract with a lower limit and a positive informal interest rate pre-
ferred by the bank as well as the moneylender.
28 The entrepreneur could satisfy her needs by only taking informal credit but borrows
from both sectors as I assume that she accepts the ﬁrst available contract if indifferent.
The same conclusion follows if moneylenders' monitoring cost was positive and constant
returns to scale.
29 Instead, hikes inωM are fully compensated by decreases in LM, while climbingωE leads
to higher LE (as the entrepreneur's incentive constraint becomes less binding) and conse-
quently lower LM.
Fig. 1. Competitive bank credit and moneylender wealth.
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dependent of ωE.30
Themodeling choice of onemoneylender is a useful simpliﬁcation to
capture that informal lending is a local activity that rests on money-
lenders' superior knowledge of their clients. From this follows the (em-
pirically motivated) assumption of exclusivity. Exclusivity does not
imply that informal lenders have market power however. As
showed above, the scarcity of informal capital affects the returns
to moneylending (see Section 4.3 for an extensive discussion of in-
formal interest rates). Poor moneylenders charge positive rates of
interest even if they keep a low share of the bargaining outcome
(when α is close to 1). This is because they need to be compensated
for the incentive rent received from banks to prevent opportunistic
behavior, and this margin cannot be competed away by the bank
sector. By contrast, as sufﬁciently wealthy moneylenders are not
tempted by diversion and obtain formal funds at marginal cost
they earn no rent in equilibrium, regardless of how they split the
surplus with the entrepreneur. In other words, returns to
moneylending are higher at lower levels of wealth when the bank
sector is competitive.
A related concern is how to interpret scarcity of informal capital in a
model with one entrepreneur. One plausible distinction between entre-
preneurs and moneylenders is the difference in technology endow-
ments. For example, while farmers' or street vendors' production
technology applies to managing their farm or selling fruit at the street
stand, traders' or merchants' monitoring technology is applicable to
more than one farmer or street vendor. This has several implications.
First, it implies that wealth-constrained traders visit formal banks more
often than a given farmer and, importantly, has less to gain from divert-
ing bank funds. Consider for instance the modiﬁed setting where
ϕM b ϕE: the opportunity cost of beingdiligent is higher for the entrepre-
neur. Here banks lend relatively more to moneylenders although entre-
preneurs continue to borrow from the formal institution.31 Second, and
related to the ﬁrst point, while the model solves the case with a
wealth-constrained moneylender unable to satisfy the credit needs of
one entrepreneur, the natural interpretation is that of a lender rationing
a set of clients. This raises the issue of how a capital-scarce moneylender
should allocate funds across his borrowers. It alsomotivates the question30 Whenα = α^, parameter changes alsomove the threshold barring a comparative static
analysis.
31 Entrepreneurs always have the option of an exclusive bank contract, making it inefﬁ-
cient to exclude them from bank access. If moneylenders were entrepreneurs' only source
of funds, entrepreneurs earn (at least) the equivalent of a bank loan but their side payment
would not be invested. However, if bank credit is extended to entrepreneurs and money-
lenders, the side payment is part of the overall investment.of who becomes a moneylender in the ﬁrst place. I brieﬂy address these
issues in the ﬁnal section of the paper.
3.3. Imperfect bank competition
Informal lenders'monitoring ability also helps banks to reduce agen-
cy cost by allowing them to channel credit through the informal sector.
To show this, formal banks need somemarket power. I start by outlining
the case without informal lenders and then characterize the outcome
under ﬁnancial sector coexistence.
The bank sets LE and DE by maximizing
DE−LE
subject to the participation constraint
Q ωE þ LEð Þ−DE≥Q ωEð Þ
and the incentive constraint given by Eq. (3). The participation con-
straint ensures at least the utility associated with self ﬁnancing the pro-
ject. DE replaces (1 + r) LE with the borrower choosing whether or not
to accept the bank's take-it-or-leave-it offer and consequently the
amount to invest. It follows that the relevant incentive and/or participa-
tion constraint must bind, otherwise the bank could increase DE and
earn a strictly higher proﬁt.
For low levels of wealth, the incentive constraint binds and the
bank's proﬁt may be written as Q(ωE + LE) − ϕ(ωE + LE) − LE The
ﬁrst-order condition of the proﬁt expression determines the optimal
loan size, whereas DE is deﬁned as the solution to the incentive con-
straint. Hence, LE is the unique loan size that solves
Q ′ ωE þ LEð Þ− 1þ ϕð Þ ¼ 0; ð13Þ
while DE is determined by
Q ωE þ LEð Þ−DE ¼ ϕ ωE þ LEð Þ: ð14Þ
A salient feature of this outcome is that entrepreneurs are provided a
constant ﬂoor rent above their outside option to satisfy the investment
level, I = ωE + LE, given by Eq. (13). Since higher wealth is met by a
parallel decrease in credit to maintain the sub-optimal investment,
any wealth improvement is pocketed by the bank. Poor entrepreneurs
are thus prevented from accumulating assets.
As wealth climbs, the participation and the incentive constraint hold
simultaneously. A higher debt capacity permits the bank to increase the
repayment obligation such that the entrepreneur is indifferent between
taking credit and self ﬁnancing the project. Since ﬁrst best is unattain-
able, the loan size continues to satisfy the incentive constraint. Hence,
the repayment is determined by the binding participation constraint,
while the equilibrium loan size solves
Q ωEð Þ ¼ ϕ ωE þ LEð Þ: ð15Þ
For rich entrepreneurs only the participation constraint binds and
ﬁrst best is obtained.
Proposition 3. For all ϕ N ϕ,there are thresholdsωmE Nω
m
E N0 such that:
(i) entrepreneurs with wealth below ωmE invest I = I′ as given by
Eq. (13), credit (LE) decreases in ωE, and I′ is independent of




) then I ∈ [I′, I⁎) is invested and LE and I in-
crease in ωE; if ωE≥ωmE then I⁎ is invested;
(ii) market power reduces efﬁciency, that is, ωmE Nω
c
E .
Bank market concentration reduces lending and investment. Intui-
tively, when increasing the price, the bank lowers the borrower's incen-
tive to repay. Hence, high interest rates must be coupled with less
lending and consequently lower investment. As a large repayment
33 As the bank's incentive rent exceeds the value of the bargaining outcome regardless of
how the proceeds are split when the entrepreneur and the moneylender pursue the pro-
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tive to default, poor customers earn rent to avoid diversion of bank
credit.
The existence of moneylenders modiﬁes this trade-off. Informal
lenders' monitoring advantage implies that channeled bank capital
saves the incentive rent the bank otherwise share with poor entre-
preneurs. Still, forwarded bank money comes at a cost as the bank
forgoes part of its surplus to prevent being cheated by the money-
lenders. To illustrate this as simply as possible, attention is restricted
to the range of wealth levels where entrepreneurs receive the bank's
ﬂoor utility, ωE b ωEm.32 Remaining cases are brieﬂy discussed in the
ﬁnal section.
Speciﬁcally, if the entrepreneur and the moneylender are poor the
bank lends to both. They receive ﬂoor contracts giving them utility
above their outside option of pursuing the entrepreneur's project on
their own. The binding incentive constraints and the ﬁrst-order condi-
tion of the bank's proﬁt expression determine credit extended, LE and
LM, and the aggregate repayment D. More precisely
α Q Ið Þ−D−ωM½  þ 1−αð ÞωE ¼ ϕ ωE þ LEð Þ; ð16Þ
1−αð Þ Q Ið Þ−D−ωE½  þ αωM ¼ ϕ ωM þ LMð Þ; ð17Þ
and
Q ′ Ið Þ− 1þ ϕð Þ ¼ 0; ð18Þ
with I = ωE + LE + ωM + LM. The bank charges a price, D = DE + DM,
paid in proportion to the share of the surplus kept by each borrower. In-
formal ﬁnance permits the bank both to decrease the entrepreneur's net
surplus and to minimize the aggregate loan supporting the sub-optimal
investment. The bank refrains from channeling the entire loan through
the informal sector, however, since the moneylender's temptation to di-
vert formal credit is too large.
As the informal lender's debt capacity improves, his participation
and incentive constraint both bind at some point. The increase in mon-
eylender wealth allows the bank to reduce the poor entrepreneur's part
of the aggregate loan to save on the incentive rent shared with her to
prevent diversion. Speciﬁcally, for the same level of investment [given
by Eq. (18)], LE is decreased in step with a climbing ωM until the entire
loan is extended to the moneylender, giving rise to credit market seg-
mentation. The moneylender's repayment obligation DM solves the
binding participation constraint
1−αð Þ Q Ið Þ−DM−ωE½  þ αωM ¼ 1−αð Þ Q ωE þωMð Þ−ωE½  þ αωM ;ð19Þ
while the equilibrium loan size LM satisﬁes
1−αð Þ Q ωE þωMð Þ−ωE½  þ αωM ¼ ϕ ωM þ LMð Þ; ð20Þ
with I = ωE + ωM + LM. The participation constraint ensures the util-
ity associated with the moneylender self ﬁnancing the project.
A rich enoughmoneylender is able to support ﬁrst best. Eq. (19) de-
termines DM and I = I⁎. Finally, if the moneylender is sufﬁciently
wealthy to self ﬁnance the investment, the bank and the moneylender
compete in the same fashion as described by Eq. (12) above.
Proposition 4. For all αN eα, ϕNϕ, and ωE b ωEm:
(i) entrepreneurs borrow from a bank and a bank-ﬁnanced money-
lender and invest I = I′ as given by Eq. (18) if ωM b ωmM;
(ii) entrepreneurs borrow exclusively from a bank-ﬁnanced money-








;32 The thresholdωEm is thewealth level at which the entrepreneurs' incentive and partic-
ipation constraint both bind. It differs fromωmE , as the investment corresponding toωE
m al-
so depends on the moneylender's wealth.(iii) entrepreneurs borrow from a bank and a self-ﬁnanced money-
lender and invest I⁎ if ωM ≥ I* − ωE.
Proposition 4 is illustrated in Fig. 2. BelowωmM, the bank lends to both
the entrepreneur and the moneylender although at a decreasing rate to
the former as themoneylender becomeswealthier. AtωmM, there is com-
plete segmentation of the formal and informal creditmarket and the en-
trepreneur is shut out by the bank (with LE = 0). As the moneylender's
wealth increases beyondωmM, his incentive constraint gradually becomes
more slack and LM starts to rise.WhenωM≥ωmM, he is able to support the
entrepreneur at the ﬁrst-best level of investment. However, the bank
still prefers to lend exclusively to the moneylender although the bank
loan starts to decline.
In sum, while informal ﬁnance raises bank-rationed borrowers' in-
vestment, it also limits formal sector access. As moneylenders become
richer, banks are able to reduce the surplus otherwise shared with
poor entrepreneurs. This contrasts with and complements the ﬁndings
of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1. In poor societies with weak legal insti-
tutions, moneylenders'monitoring ability therefore induces two oppos-
ing effects. On the one hand, informal ﬁnance complements banks by
allowing more formal capital to reach borrowers directly. On the other
hand, informal lenders substitute for banks by acting as a formal credit
channel. The extent to which either effect dominates depends on the
degree of competition in the formal bank sector.
Note that the constraint on informal lenders' market power is that
the entrepreneur's share of the Nash Bargaining exceeds ﬁnancing the
project on her own [αN eα as deﬁned by Eq. (5)]. This is because themo-
nopoly bank prefers lending to both agents at low levels of wealth, bar-
ring the option of an exclusive bank contract on part of the entrepreneur
or the moneylender.33 Under segmentation, bank lending is no longer
available to the entrepreneur and αN eα ensures that she remains a cus-
tomer of themoneylender. Also,while the analysis assumes that the for-
mal sector is a monopoly, it is sufﬁcient that the bank has enough
market power to make informal lenders' participation constraint bind
at some point. Then the bank always ﬁnds it more proﬁtable to contract
exclusively with the informal sector rather than dealing directly with
poor borrowers.
Fig. 3 summarizes Propositions 2 and 4 in terms of the
moneylender's debt capacity (assuming a bank-rationed entrepre-
neur). The competitive benchmark is depicted above the line, with
the moneylender's incentive constraint binding below ωcM . Bank
lending to the informal sector continues up to ωcM , at which point
the moneylender self-ﬁnances his operations. The imperfectly com-
petitive case is illustrated underneath the line. The incentive con-
straint binds alone below ωmM and together with the participation
constraint in-between ωmM and ω
m
M The participation constraint deter-
mines the outcome in-between ωmM and I⁎ − ωE. As Fig. 3 illustrates,
bank market competition both increases efﬁciency (ωcMbω
m
M ) and
reduces the amount of formal funding channeled by the moneylenders
(ωcMbI
∗−ωE ). The sections that follow will examine these points in
more detail. (The proofs of Proposition 9 and Lemmas A5 and A9 settle
the relation between the thresholds.34)4. Institutions, market segmentation, and prices
Having established the aggregate demand for and supply of formal
and informal credit, I now consider factors that may help explain the
prevalence and the persistence of informal ﬁnance, aswell the variation
in informal interest rates.jectwithout the bank,α only needs to guarantee a utility abovewhat the entrepreneur ob-
tains when self ﬁnancing her investment.





m) increases (decreases) inϕ. In
what follows, I disregard this possibility.
Fig. 2. Uncompetitive bank credit and moneylender wealth.
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Empirical evidence shows that the use of informal ﬁnance is consis-
tently higher in low-income countries and that bank lending contracts
as creditor protection worsens (Chavis et al., 2009; Dabla-Norris and
Koeda, 2008). This section explores these questions at some length by
studying one of themodel's key premises: that informal ﬁnance emerges
in response to banks' inability to enforce their legal claims. It also inves-
tigates the implications of variation in income and in bankmarket struc-
ture. As the competitiveness of the informal sector, α, has an effect on
some of my ﬁndings, I initially analyze results that are independent of α.
I ﬁrst show that weaker institutions increase the prevalence of infor-
mal credit if borrowers obtain money from both ﬁnancial sectors, while
the opposite is true if moneylenders supply all funds. Speciﬁcally, if en-
trepreneurs and moneylenders obtain bank credit and moneylenders
are rich enough not to be tempted by diversion, the ratio of informal
credit to investment, B=I ¼ ωM þ LM
 
= ωE þ LE þωM þ LM
 
, increases
in creditor vulnerability ϕ. A hike in ϕ boosts the proﬁtability of non-
prudent behavior relative to investment for poor entrepreneurs, induc-
ing a shift to agency-free informal ﬁnance (Corollary 1). Consider then
the case of credit market segmentation. If bank-rationed moneylenders
are the only providers of entrepreneurial credit, worse legal protection
causes banks to cut the funding of the informal sector to avoid diversion.
That is, the fraction B/I decreases in ϕ. At ﬁrst best, more efﬁcient institu-
tions are irrelevant for B/I since diversion no longer tempts the money-
lender. These opposing effects may explain the indeterminacy found in
some of the data with respect to the relation between rule of law and
the size of the informal sector (see Section 5 for an extensive discussion).
My theory further predicts that the ratio B/I increases if bor-
rowers are poor and if moneylenders are better capitalized. To see
this, note that a rise in entrepreneurial wealth induces a shift from
informal to formal ﬁnance and a lower B/I if moneylenders are rich
enough to attain ﬁrst best in the competitive benchmark.35 If the en-
trepreneur and the moneylender both obtain bank credit under im-
perfect bank competition, increases in wealth lead to a decrease in
credit to limit diversion [below ωmM in Fig. 2]. For example, a higher
ωE reduces the moneylender's share of the aggregate loan LM and
B/I drops.36 By contrast, if the moneylender is the only bank35 That is, LE (LM) increases (decreases) following a boost in ωE (Corollary 1). Higher
moneylender wealth does not affect B/I though, as hikes in ωM are compensated by de-
creases in LM.
36 As investment is locked at the suboptimal level [given by Eq. (18)], an increase in ωE
only improves the entrepreneur's bargaining position, forcing the bank to lower LM.borrower, bank credit increases in ωM, boosting B relatively more
than I as the entrepreneur's wealth is unaffected [see the range be-
tween ωmM and ω
m
M in Fig. 2].
37
Proposition 5. For bank-rationed entrepreneurs, the ratio of informal
credit to investment is:
(i) increasing in creditor vulnerability (ϕ), decreasing in entrepre-
neurs' wealth (ωE), and independent of moneylenders' wealth
(ωM) if banks are competitive and ωM≥ωcM;
(ii) nonincreasing in ϕ forωM≥ωmM, decreasing inωE forωMbωmM and
for ωM≥ωmM , and nondecreasing in ωM if banks have market
power and ωM b I⁎ − ωE.
A limitation of Proposition 5 is that it does not apply if entrepre-
neurs and moneylenders are rationed by competitive banks. This is
because variation in ϕ, ωE, and ωM affects LE and LM simultaneously,
with the impact on B/I depending on how the project gains are
shared. This is also true for some of the changes in ωE under market
segmentation.38 However, by restricting attention to a competitive
informal credit market (α = 1), the model gives consistent predic-
tions both with respect to institutional quality and with respect to
wealth.
Corollary 2. For bank-rationed entrepreneurs, the ratio of competitive
informal credit to investment is:
(i) increasing in creditor vulnerability (ϕ) and decreasing in entre-
preneurs' wealth (ωE) if banks are competitive;
(ii) nonincreasing inωE if banks havemarket power andωM b I∗ − ωE.
The results presented in Proposition 5 thus continue to hold in
this restricted setting. Interestingly, the ﬁrst part of Corollary 2
shows that informal ﬁnance becomes more important as institution-
al quality deteriorates even when informal lenders are poor. This is
because the reduction in entrepreneurs' bank credit that follows
from a higher ϕ dominates the drop in informal lenders' bank credit.
To see this, consider the moneylender under bank competition. The
decline in LE exceeds the fall in LM , since the entrepreneur keeps
the full surplus and subsequently holds a larger part of the aggregate
bank loan (Corollary 1). (Wealth results follow in similar fashion
from Corollary 1.) Under market segmentation, the moneylender's
loan and the fraction B/I is independent of entrepreneurial wealth
if α = 1, as ωE does not enter Eq. (20).
Using historical data from the United States, Wang (2008) docu-
ments how poor farmers primarily relied on wealthy (bank-ﬁnanced)
merchants when the degree of competition in the formal ﬁnan-
cial sector was low. Propositions 2 and 4 suggest precisely this;
that the relative importance of bank-ﬁnanced moneylenders in-
creases in banks' market power. To show this formally, I ﬁrst
characterize the economy's supply of bank credit. As market
structure is irrelevant if moneylenders rely on internal funds, attention
is restricted to wealth levels where informal lenders need external
capital.
Lemma 1. (i) Entrepreneurs obtain more funds from competitive
banks; (ii) There exists a threshold ω^M α;ϕð Þ∈ ωcM ;ωcM
 
such thatmon-
eylenders with wealth below ω^M obtain more funds from competitive
banks and moneylenders with wealth above ω^M obtain more funds
under imperfect bank competition.
Since all beneﬁts accrue to the entrepreneurs under competitive
banking, banks supply more credit as a result of improved incentives.37 At ﬁrst best, the outcome is analogous to the competitive case described in footnote 35.
38 The effect ofϕ on B/I is ambiguous belowωmM (when entrepreneurs andmoneylenders
access the bank under imperfect bank competition), as a higher ϕ leads to less bank lend-
ing and a lower suboptimal investment [given by (18)]. The total effect depends on which
reduction is larger (independently of how project proceeds are split).
Fig. 3.Moneylender wealth thresholds across the banking regimes.
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to ﬁrst best (ωcM), then reduce their loan in step with rising wealth.
Meanwhile, the imperfectly competitive bank continues to extend addi-
tional funds as the efﬁcient outcome (ωmM) remains to be attained.
Proposition 6. The ratio of informal credit to investment is higher
when banks have market power and ωM∈ ω^M; I∗−ωEð Þ and indetermi-
nate with respect to bank market structure for wealth below ω^M .
While entrepreneurs obtain more funds from poor moneylenders if
banks compete, they also take additional bank credit (Lemma 1), mak-
ing the exact prediction imprecise. However, as moneylenders become
wealthier the outcome is clear: informal ﬁnance should bemore impor-
tant if it allows banks to save the agency costs.39 For additional evidence, see Udry (1990, 1994) and La Ferrara (2003) for the case of
Africa and Das-Gupta et al. (1989) and Siamwalla et al. (1990) for the case of Asia.
40 The zero interest result partly depends on the assumption of zero monitoring cost.
However, while allowing for positivemonitoring cost onpart of themoneylender adds an-
other layer, it does not qualitatively alter the ﬁndings.4.2. Welfare, segmentation, and ﬁnancial development
Why does ﬁnancial sector underdevelopment, in the form of market
segmentation, persist? One reason is that those who potentially inﬂu-
ence the levers of power (for example, wealthy informal lenders and in-
ﬂuential bankers) gain from status quo. As discussed in more detail
below, bank markets in the early twentieth century United States
were more concentrated in counties with wealthy landowners, who
often engaged in lending to local farmers (Rajan and Ramcharan,
2011). I investigate this issuehere by consideringhowwelfare is distrib-
uted in the economy.
Proposition 7. (i) Entrepreneurs and poor moneylenders,ωMbωcM, are
better off when banks are competitive, whereas banks and sufﬁciently
wealthymoneylenders,ωM NωcM, are better off when banks havemarket
power; (ii) Entrepreneurs prefer a bankwithmarket power over the co-
existence of a moneylender and a bank with market power.
Informal ﬁnance supports entrepreneurs' asset growth in the
competitive setting. The reason is twofold. Competition transfers
the entire surplus to the bank borrowers, allowing more credit to
be extended. Moneylenders reinforce this effect by further
expanding credit provision and by softening the entrepreneurs' in-
centive problem. Competition also adds value to poor moneylenders
as they receive more bank funds. By contrast, banks and wealthier
moneylenders are better off if ﬁnancial markets are segmented.
This is because the segmented outcome preserves the market power
that moneylenders' enforcement advantage grants them (α remains
unchanged), whereas they are forced to give up all their rent under
competitive banking (α = 1). Part (ii) of Proposition 7 makes bor-
rowers' welfare loss explicit. Poor entrepreneurs receive less funds
and consequently lower ﬂoor utility from the monopoly bank (for a
given investment) if it also extends credit to the moneylender. If mon-
eylenders provide all external capital, entrepreneurs earn the equiva-
lent of doing the project alone with the informal lender, worth strictly
less than the incentive rent provided by the bank.
In sum, besides allowing banks to reduce agency cost, credit market
segmentation also softens competition between the formal and the in-
formal ﬁnancial sector, providing an additional rationale for its
persistence.4.3. Informal interest rates
Aleem (1990), Banerjee (2003), and others have shown that poor
borrowers with similar characteristics face informal interest rates rang-
ing from 0 to 200% annually in India, Pakistan, and Thailand.39 In fact,
there is large variation in informal lending rates even within the same
sub economy. I now examine factors that rationalize some of the ob-
served heterogeneity.
Proposition 8. (i) Bank-rationedmoneylenders charge positive rates of
interest, R/B − 1 N 0; (ii) R/B − 1 N 0 is higher when moneylenders
are sufﬁciently wealthy, ωM NωcM , and banks have market power.
First, poor moneylenders charge positive rates of interest regardless
of the degree of competition in the adjacent bank market. This is be-
cause the price of informal credit reﬂects the incentive rent money-
lenders receive to ensure prudent behavior when forwarding bank
funds. Competition from the bank sector is thus softened as excessive
lending to poor entrepreneurs and/or poor moneylenders would result
in diversion. By contrast, a self-ﬁnanced informal sector offers credit at
the opportunity cost of funds.
Second, as moneylender wealth climbs, informal lenders make no
proﬁt in the competitive setting (α = 1). Meanwhile, the segmented
outcome preserves moneylenders' bargaining position [ eα∈ 0;1ð Þ ]
resulting in strictly positive interest rates. In fact, as long as informal
lenders ﬁnance their operations using formal bank credit, ωM b I⁎ −ωE,
their enforcement advantage grants them rent under imperfect bank
competition.
The impact of scarce informal capital on informal interest rates thus
depends on the interaction between creditor vulnerability and the com-
petitiveness of the bankingmarket, with terms offered to the same bor-
rower ranging from an effective price of zero to very high rates.
Accounting for informal lenders' ﬁnancing capacity and the possibility
of market segmentation complements the emphasis on monitoring
cost as an explanation for the observed steep lending rates (see
Banerjee, 2003).40
5. Empirical evidence
The analysis in Section 3 (Propositions 2 and 4) highlights the inter-
action between weak institutions, poor agents, and inefﬁcient markets.
As brieﬂy reviewed in the introduction, there is ample evidence show-
ing that better legal protection alleviates credit rationing, that informal
lenders turn to the formal ﬁnancial sector for additional funds, and that
market power is a recurring phenomenon in developing credit markets.
Combining these facts, the model concludes that all but the wealthiest
borrowers turn either to both ﬁnancial sectors simultaneously or to
the informal sector exclusively.
The ﬁnding that borrowers' formal sector debt capacity increases in
their wealth is consistent with a series of empirical studies on formal–
45 Esquires and gentlemen were honorary titles given to people with more wealth and
higher social status. Esquires could be merchants, large land-owning farmers, attorneys,
and judges. Gentlemenwere another economically better-off class, if not quite as wealthy
as esquires.
46 That is, the cases where farmers appeared as defendants and merchants as plaintiffs
declined after the entry.
47 Note that 30% of the households in 1991 still held loans from the government, traders,
and landlords.
166 A. Madestam / Journal of Development Economics 107 (2014) 157–174informal sector interactions in Africa (Graham et al., 1988; Steel et al.,
1997), Asia (Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2007; Bell et al., 1997; Floro and
Yotopoulos, 1991; Giné, 2011), and South America (Conning, 2001;
Key, 1997). For example, in Giné's study of 2880 households and 606
small businesses in rural Thailand, the richest borrowers (measured
both by wealth and income) access the formal sector exclusively. As
wealth declines, borrowers resort either to informal lenders (including
landlords, professional moneylenders, traders, and store owners)
aloneor to bothﬁnancial sectors. A similar pattern emergeswhen inves-
tigating informal lenders' formal sector debt capacity. In a survey of 96
wholesalers and retail merchants in Niger, Graham et al. report that
the size of retail merchants' formal sector loan increases in their asset
base.
Several case studies illustrate the complementarity between formal
and informal ﬁnance. In particular, local traders and input suppliers,
drawing on funds from banks and upstream buyers, often provide
farmers with inputs and credit in the form of cash and in-kind loans on
machinery, seeds, and fertilizers.41 In these instances, informal lenders'
capital base not only raises investment but also enables borrowers to
draw on additional formal ﬁnance. In their account of contract farming
in North America, Latin America, and Africa, Glover and Kusterer
(1990) write that the informal funding provided by traders and input
suppliers “serves to assure banks of the farmer's credit-worthiness,
thus facilitating access to private [bank] credit” (Glover and Kusterer,
1990, p. 130).42 Related evidence is provided by Campion (2006) in her
study of Peru's artichoke sector. Campion documents that artichoke pro-
cessors and input suppliers “provide valuableﬁnance…to help farmers…
to produce high quality artichokes in greater quantity and improve their
returns on investment. Higher returns have lead to greater access to for-
mal ﬁnance…” (Campion, 2006, p. 10). Wittlinger and Tuesta's (2006)
description of soybean farmers in Paraguay tells a similar story. Farmers
sell their produce to and receive credit from upstream silos that actively
oversee the production process. This phase-by-phase supervisionmeans
that the bank ofﬁcers spend less time monitoring the loan, allowing for
more formal capital to be lent directly to the farmers. Moreover, the
silos also take bank loans to ﬁnance fertilizers, fuel, and agricultural
equipment provided as in-kind inputs to the farmers.43
The empirical regularity that wealthier informal lenders often are
the exclusive clients of formal banks (rather than poor borrowers)
supports the prediction that banks may prefer to channel their capital
through the informal sector. In their study of Philippine agricultural
ﬁnance, Floro and Yotopoulos (1991) note that formal lenders and up-
stream buyers rarely deal directly with smaller borrowers. Instead, the
formal lenders rely on rich farmer-clients as “they [the rich farmers]
have the assets required for leverage” (Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991,
p. 46). Similarly, Rahman (1992) reports that although formal credit
totals more than two thirds of the informal sector's liabilities in
Bangladesh, less than ten percent of the households borrow directly
from the formal sector. Those that take formal credit (and on lend)
are “people with sufﬁcient collateral and credibility to borrow from
formal sector ﬁnancial institutions” (Rahman, 1992, p. 154). Related
support is provided by Harriss (1983) in her study of 400 agricultural
traders and paddy producers in Tamil Nandu, India where large
farmers take formal credit to be on lent to poorer clients. Evidence
from Japan's Meiji era (1868–1912) shows a similar pattern. During
this period, wealthier grain, fertilizer, or textile merchants, land-
lords, and professional moneylenders obtained bank credit to ﬁ-
nance poor farmers, weavers, and silk producers otherwise unable
to secure external funding (Teranishi, 2005, 2007).4441 See Reardon and Timmer (2007) for the importance of credit provision in the agricul-
tural output market.
42 See also Watts (1994) for related support.
43 For a similar account from Croatia, see Matić et al. (2006).
44 See Biggs (1991) for related evidence from early twentieth century Taiwan, where
larger ﬁrms on-lent commercial bank credit directly to smaller downstream customers
lacking bank access.In the model, the degree of bank competition affects formal
ﬁnancial sector access as well as the role of informal lenders. This
is in line with historical evidence from Plymouth County in New
England, United States (Wang, 2008). Using detailed bank, census,
and court records between 1803 and 1850, Wang documents how
increased bank competition allowed poor farmers and artisans to
partially substitute from informal ﬁnance provided by wealthier
(bank-ﬁnanced) merchants, to formal bank credit. Bank records
show that merchants, esquires, and gentlemen (the rich) accounted
for most of the transactions when the county comprised one bank.45
Meanwhile, the court records of debt claims identify the same
wealthy group as providers of credit to farmers and artisans. After
the entry of an additional bank, the proportion of bank loans to mer-
chants declined from 60 to 25% while farmers and artisans increased
their share from 12 to 38%. The court records also show that farmers
and artisans were less likely to borrow from wealthy merchants.46
Contemporary data echo these ﬁndings. In Giné's (2011) study of
formal–informal sector interactions in Thailand, poor borrowers
are less likely to access the informal sector exclusively when bank
competition increases. Also, Burgess and Pande's (2005) investiga-
tion of the effects of bank branch expansion in India (effectively, in-
creased formal sector competition) shows a similar pattern. They
ﬁnd that bank borrowing as a share of total rural household debt
increased from 0.3 to 29% between 1961 and 1991. Meanwhile, bor-
rowing from professional moneylenders fell from 61 to 16% in the
same period.47, 48
My model also suggests that that weaker legal institutions increase
the prevalence of informal credit if borrowers obtain money from
both ﬁnancial sectors, while the opposite is true if informal lenders sup-
ply all funds. Using ﬁrm-level data for 26 countries in Eastern Europe
and Central Asia, Dabla-Norris and Koeda (2008) broadly conﬁrm
Proposition 5 and Corollary 2. They show that the relationship between
legal institutions and informal credit is indeterminate, while bank lend-
ing contracts as creditor protection worsens. More systematic evidence
is offered in a recent study by Chavis et al. (2009) covering 70,000 small
andmedium-sized ﬁrms in over 100 countries. As implied by themodel,
improvements in creditor protection have a positive effect on access to
bank ﬁnance, particularly for young (and small) ﬁrms.49 Speciﬁcally, the
interaction between rule of law and ﬁrm age is signiﬁcant and negative
for bank ﬁnance. Meanwhile, there is no signiﬁcant interactive effect of
rule of law for ﬁnance coming from informal sources and trade credit.
My theory explains the insigniﬁcant effect by showing that the relation-
ship can go either way, while bank credit—if accessible—increases in
creditor protection. Dabla-Norris and Koeda and Chavis et al. also ﬁnd
that the use of informal ﬁnance is consistently higher in lower-income
countries. If entrepreneurial wealth is a proxy for income, this is line
with the model's prediction that informal ﬁnance grows in importance
as borrower wealth declines.
Proposition 7 shows that wealthier informal lenders (and banks)
prefer the segmented outcome that arises with bank market power,
as it softens competition between the ﬁnancial sectors. This48 Findings from China also show that informal ﬁnance is more prevalent in the central
and the northwest regions where bank competition is scant and less important in the
coastal region where banks are more competitive (Ayyagari et al., 2010; Cheng and
Degryse, 2010; Cull and Xu, 2005).
49 A drawback of these ﬁndings is their focus on ﬁrm age rather than ﬁrm size/collateral.
Other variables, such as reputation, may have an independent effect on credit access be-
sides collateral. However, to the extent that young ﬁrms still have lower wealth, the em-
pirical evidence does corroborate the model's conclusions.
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bent ﬁnancial institutions' historical support for ﬁnancial repres-
sion to maintain status quo. In particular, suppose rich
moneylenders and bankers have more say over local bank market
structure than poor entrepreneurs, for example, through branching
restrictions on banking. In this case, Proposition 7 provides a
political-economy explanation as to why informal ﬁnance and
bank market power are pervasive features of less developed credit
markets. In line with my theory, Rajan and Ramcharan (2011) ﬁnd
that bank markets in the early twentieth century United States
were more concentrated in counties with wealthy landowners,
who often engaged in lending to local farmers. These landlords fre-
quently had ties with the local bank and the local store (that of-
fered credit) and were, as the model predicts, against bank
deregulation.50 Rajan and Ramcharan show that there were fewer
banks per capita and less formal bank lending to poor farmers (as
well as higher formal interest rates) in counties with a more un-
equal distribution of farm land. This is consistent with the skewed
distribution of wealth needed to support the theory's predictions.
In the model, relatively better-off informal lenders are more credit-
worthy compared to poor entrepreneurs.
6. Economic policy
Before I consider possible reforms, let me summarize themain re-
sults so far.51 The model's basic distortion is the inability of formal
banks to enforce their contracts. Better functioning institutions not
only allow banks to lend more to poor borrowers and poor informal
lenders, they can also reduce informal interest rates.52 If the aim is to
replace informal with formal ﬁnance, wealth subsidies may be more
effective policy however. While the prevalence of informal ﬁnance
decreases in entrepreneurial wealth, informal credit becomes more
important as legal protection of banks improves if credit markets
are segmented.
Propositions 2 and 4 show that ﬁnancial sector coexistence in-
creases efﬁciency compared to a pure bank lending regime. The
policy recommendations that follow are straightforward from an
efﬁciency perspective, but less clear in terms of borrower welfare.
Although regulation fostering informal sector growth is beneﬁcial
for poor borrowers in the competitive benchmark, the opposite is
true under credit market segmentation (Proposition 7). Moreover,
while pro-competitive bank reforms raise efﬁciency,53 help borrowers
access the formal sector, and reduce informal interest rates, the caveat
may be the lack of political will to introduce such policies, as discussed
in Section 4.2. Hence, programs that strengthen borrowers' outside
options (similar to the empowerment strategies of poor tenants docu-
mented in Banerjee et al., 2002) offer a way to diminish the reliance
on credit provided by informal lenders and banks. Speciﬁcally, it points
to the importance of alternative sources of credit, such as microﬁnance.
In fact, microﬁnance programs may present a more viable alternative if
powerful vested interests (in the form of wealthy informal lenders and
banks) are opposed to bank market reforms.50 In his study of farm credit in Texas, Haney (1914) writes that the “country merchant
act as the banker's agent inmaking cropmortgage loan” (Haney, 1914, p. 54). Haney esti-
mates that asmuch as 20% of all loans in Texas banks weremade to countrymerchants for
the purpose of funding crop mortgage securities.
51 In what follows, I examine policies that are productivity enhancing, that is, they raise
investment. This does not imply Pareto efﬁciency however; see Bardhan et al. (2000) for a
discussion.
52 The interaction between creditor vulnerability and the credit market endogenously
determines the threshold of wealth necessary to attain an efﬁcient investment using only
bank funds. Hence, stronger creditor protection also implies that entrepreneurs with less
wealth will succeed in securing an exclusive bank contract.
53 In the proof of Proposition 9, I show that ωmM Nω
c
M . That is, a moneylender stops bor-
rowing from competitive banks before ﬁrst best is attained in the imperfectly competitive
case. [See Fig. (3).]I now analyze the effects of subsidized credit by allowing for a
positive cost of bank capital, ρ. Introducing ρ has three effects: it of-
fers a deposit return that enters the outside option in the bargaining,
it affects the residual return for a given loan size, and it alters the
sub-optimal investment if banks have market power. While a
lower ρ increases investment if the moneylender and the entrepre-
neur obtain bank credit—regardless of bank market structure—it
decreases lending to the bank-rationed moneylender and subse-
quent investment under market segmentation. This is because a
drop in ρ weakens the moneylender's outside option in his
bargaining with the entrepreneur, while the bank's price is unaffect-
ed [as DM N (1 + ρ)LM]. The end effect is a decrease in the preva-
lence of informal ﬁnance and lower efﬁciency.
Proposition 9. (i) Financial sector coexistence and bank market com-
petition increase investment (I); (ii) I decreases in the opportunity
cost of capital (ρ), except ifmoneylenders are bank rationed under cred-
it market segmentation, then I increases in ρ.
Which reform is most efﬁcient? In what follows, I explore the dif-
ferential impact of changes in creditor protection, cost of capital, and
wealth in terms of gross beneﬁts. Under bank competition, reduced
creditor vulnerability boosts investment more than a lower cost of
capital. The reason is that ϕ inﬂuences the marginal return to the en-
tire investment, whereas ρ only affects the return to the bank loan.
Speciﬁcally, a drop in ϕ decreases both the opportunity cost of
being diligent with bank credit (LE þ LM) and with internal funds
(ωE + ωM), while a reduction in ρ increases the residual return for
a given loan (LE þ LM). In the imperfectly competitive scenario, two
cases need to be considered.When the entrepreneur and themoney-
lender borrow from the bank, changes in creditor vulnerability and
cost of capital have an analogous impact on the sub-optimal invest-
ment given by Eq. (18).54 Under market segmentation, a lower ϕ in-
creases investment (Proposition 5), while a reduction in ρ decreases
it (Proposition 9).55
Wealth subsidies to borrowers follow the standard prescription in
credit-rationingmodels, where redistribution in favor of poor entrepre-
neurs supports increased borrowing and investment. In my model, in-
formal lenders also face binding credit constraints, suggesting that
these policy implications need to be modiﬁed. Consider a reform that
redistributes one dollar from the entrepreneur to the moneylender. If
rationed entrepreneurs andmoneylenders access the bank, the transfer
affects the bargainingweights and subsequent bank lending, but not the
project's size since every dollar is invested. Undermarket segmentation,
a reallocation in favor of the bank-rationed moneylender increases in-
vestment. As the moneylender's share of the investment outcome, not
the overall size, determines the incentive-compatible bank loan
[Eq. (20)], an additional dollar of moneylender wealth draws more
bank money into the project. A similar result is obtained in the com-
petitive benchmark if entrepreneurs' opportunity cost of being dili-
gent exceeds moneylenders' cost, ϕM b ϕE. Although every dollar is
invested, moneylenders attract more bank credit since they are less
likely to divert the funds. In sum, while grants to poor entrepreneurs
increase investment and decrease the prevalence of informal ﬁ-
nance, transfers to the informal sector may be a more efﬁcient policy
choice.
Proposition 10. Investment (I) increases weakly if:
(i) creditor vulnerability (ϕ) decreases rather than the opportunity
cost of capital (ρ) and I b I⁎;
(ii) wealth is redistributed from entrepreneurs to moneylenders.54 More speciﬁcally, the modiﬁed equation reads Q′(I) − (1 + ϕ + ρ) = 0.
55 Atﬁrst best, variation inϕ has no effect on investmentwhile a reduction inρ increases
investment by changing the optimal project size, determined by Q′(I) − (1 + ρ) = 0.
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fect monitoring ability. If entrepreneurs invest a fraction of the informal
loan, the statement remains correct under credit market segmentation,
while thepolicy lowers efﬁciency in the competitivebenchmark. Inefﬁcient
monitoringmatters less under segmentation as the transfer'smain effect in
this case comes through a shift in the relative bargaining weights.567. Discussion and concluding remarks
A worthwhile question is why the bank does not merge with the
moneylender, making him the local branch manager? Speciﬁcally, the
bank supplies the ﬁnancial resources and the moneylender the local
knowledge. In the current setting, internal funds are a necessary condi-
tion however. Incentive compatibility is violated if banks extend credit
to penniless informal lenders/bank employees. Consider the competi-
tive benchmarkwith a competitive informal sector. In this case, money-
lenders' incentive constraint collapses toR−LM ¼ LM−LM ¼ 0bϕLM. But
it is also true when moneylenders hold all the bargaining power.57 Two
important observations follow. First, it is not sufﬁcient to have a superi-
or enforcement technology to on lend bank funds. Second, informal
lenders are not bank agents; they need to put their own money at
stake to facilitate the intermediation of formal credit. In sum, “bringing
themarket inside the ﬁrm” at best replicates themarket outcome, as the
branchmanager has to be incentivized to act responsibly with the bank
funds. However, the merger also adds a new dimension, the employer–
employee relationship, which opens up for opportunistic behavior on
the part of the bank as well.58 Hence, the overall effect is likely to be ef-
ﬁciency reducing, conﬁrming why this kind of organizational design is
uncommon in developing credit markets.
A related concern is whether the key insights would be altered if in-
formal monitoringwas less efﬁcient, if other sharing rules governed the
moneylender's and the entrepreneur's exchange, or if agents engaged in
side payments? As regards the ﬁrst objection, suppose the entrepreneur
fails to invest a fraction δ ∈ (0,1) of themoneylender's funds.59 It can be
shown that for δ sufﬁciently small, equilibrium outcomes remain the
same. Pertaining to the choice of sharing rule, the Nash Bargaining solu-
tion produces an efﬁcient outcome similar to Coasian bargaining since
utility is transferable. Any sharing rule therefore yields quantitatively
similar results in terms of the ensuing investment. Finally, side pay-
ments do not change the equilibrium outcomes since poor entrepre-
neurs and/or poor moneylenders are unable to compensate the other
party and/or the bank due to their wealth constraints. That is, available
funds are always used most efﬁciently in production. To see this, take
the case of competitive banking. Note ﬁrst that the option of investing
and lending is individually and jointly incentive compatible for
wealth-constrained entrepreneurs and moneylenders [the former is
given by Eqs. (9) and (10) and the latter by the maximum-incentive
compatible investment level, Q(I) − I + ωE + ωM = ϕ(I), derived
from Eqs. (9) and (10)]. Suppose then that the entrepreneur still is
constrained while the moneylender is sufﬁciently wealthy such that
ﬁrst best is attained. Here the best option for the entrepreneur is to56 If the diversion return is higher for the entrepreneurs, ϕM b ϕE, Proposition 10 is still
valid evenwith imperfect informalmonitoring, given that themonitoring technology is ef-
ﬁcient enough and/or the difference ϕE − ϕM is sufﬁciently large.
57 First, note that theproject's aggregate incentive-compatible bank loan is the same,with or
without the penniless moneylender, as he does not add to investment. Second, when α ¼ α^,
the entrepreneur receives her outside option, equivalent of exclusive bankborrowing, but this
is exactly the value of the entire project including the moneylender. Hence, after compensat-
ing the entrepreneur, the moneylender earns zero. When bank competition is imperfect, a
loan to a penniless moneylender satisﬁes incentive compatibility. However, entrepreneurs
prefer an exclusive bank contract as it increases their incentive rent. Since the bank is indiffer-
ent between lending to entrepreneurs alone or both (aggregate rent and loan size remain the
same) and entrepreneurs are the project's proprietors, moneylenders get shut out.
58 Similar in spirit to Williamson's (1985) arguments of why “selective interventions”
are hard to implement.
59 The value δ could be a deadweight loss or, alternatively, a beneﬁt accruing directly to
the entrepreneur.use his wealth within the project and boost the credit line (and corre-
sponding investment).
Allowing for rising entrepreneurial wealth in the imperfectly com-
petitive case changes little if the entrepreneur's wealth climbs and
wealth disparity is maintained. Here the bank is indifferent between
dealing with the (relatively) richer moneylender alone and lending a
small amount to the entrepreneur and the remainder to the money-
lender. If the entrepreneur is the richer party, the outcome resembles
the one analyzed in detail above, nowwith the bank gradually reducing
its loan to the poor moneylender. If entrepreneurs and moneylenders
are equally afﬂuent though short ofﬁrst best, both receive credit. Finally,
similar to bank competition, rich entrepreneurs only take bank credit.
Thuswhatmatters for the results is that informal lenders hold relatively
more assets compared to entrepreneurs.
An alternative interpretation of my model complements theoretical
work on group lending. In this modiﬁed setting, the bank lends to mul-
tiple entrepreneurs whowork on a joint project. This extension follows
naturally given the assumption that themoneylender and the entrepre-
neur have the same ϕ. Similar to theories of joint-liability lending, the
entrepreneur and the moneylender have a mutual interest in enforcing
their contractwith respect to the shared project, with the important dif-
ference that they are individually liable versus the bank.60
In addition, as the model stands, informal lenders' occupational
choice is restricted to lending. The setup has allowed me to analyze
how the basic traits uniting informal lenders: local enforcement and
some wealth, shape less developed credit markets. In a more general
setting, additional sources of income (and/or collateral) make it less
tempting to behave non-diligently, enabling the bank to supply more
funds or save on incentive-related costs. Extending the theory by admit-
ting complementary sources of incomewould permit for a characteriza-
tion of how informal lenders' enforcement technology anddebt capacity
vary across occupation and how monitoring ability and wealth interact
in attracting outside funding. For example, are input suppliers better
suited to extend credit to poor farmers and draw on external capital,
as compared to landlords, merchants, shopkeepers, and upstream
buyers? Another issue worthwhile to investigate, is how a capital-
constrained moneylender allocates his funds across multiple bor-
rowers? A conjecture is that the informal lender equalizes the returns
across his clients i, j such that R′(Bi) = R′(Bj), for i ≠ j. As repayment
is a function of the amount invested, Bwill be set to equalize investment
across the borrowers. A constrained lender would, however, be forced
to ration those with low project returns. The fact that informal capital
may be scarce also raises the question of who becomes a moneylender.
Such a model has the potential to explain, among other things, how
the informal sector's market power is determined. If enforcement
rests on social sanctions available within a community but all mem-
bers are equally poor, anyone can become a moneylender, as well as
attract outside funding. By contrast, if one villager is slightly wealth-
ier than the rest, she will attract all outside funding and become the
local monopolist. Another topic for future researchwould be to develop
a more explicit political-economy model to understand the interaction
between the credit market and the formation of interest groups.
In closing, the theory laid out in this paper lends itself to empirical
testing. While the key ﬁndings stand up well to the available evidence,
more quantitative work is needed to thoroughly understand how the
informal sector's resource constraints affect its ability to ﬁnance poor
borrowers as well as attract outside funding. Combining systematic
data on informal lenders' debt capacity with measures of institutional
quality and market structure would also allow for further tests of the
model's predictions. Detailed micro evidence that sheds light on the
role played by informal ﬁnance would be an important complement
to the growing experimental literature investigating microﬁnance in
developing countries.60 I thank a referee for this point.
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The following result will be helpful in the subsequent analysis.
Lemma A2. Q ′ ωE þ LE
 
− 1þ ϕð Þb0.
Proof. When the entrepreneur (henceforth E) borrows from a compet-
itive bank and the credit limit binds,
Q ωE þ LE
 
−LE−ϕ ωE þ LE
  ¼ 0: ðA1Þ
This constraint is only binding ifQ ′ ωE þ LE
 
− 1þ ϕð Þb0. Otherwise,
LE could be increased without violating the constraint. □
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 is proved in the main text, except for the comparative
static results and the existence and the uniqueness of ωEc.
Lemma A3. There exists a unique threshold ωEc(ϕ) N 0 such that
Q ωE þ LE
 
−LE−ϕ ωE þ LE
  ¼ 0 for ωE = ωEc(ϕ) and ωE þ LE ¼ I.
Proof. The threshold ωEc is the smallest wealth level that satisﬁes ωE þ
LE ¼ I . As Eq. (A1) yields the maximum incentive-compatible invest-
ment level, ωEc satisﬁes
Q I
 
−I 1þ ϕð Þ þωcE ¼ 0 ðA2Þ
The threshold is unique if LE is increasing in ωE. Differentiating




′ ωE þ LE
 
Q ′ ωE þ LE
 
− 1þ ϕð Þ N0;
where the inequality follows from Lemma A2, Q′(I) ≥ 1, and ϕ b 1.
Finally,ωEc N 0 is a result of the assumption thatϕNϕ [Eq. (1)]. □
Lemma A4. If ωE ≤ ωEc then LE and I increase in ωE and decrease in ϕ.
Proof. The proof that dLE=dωE N0 is provided in Lemma A3. As Eq. (A1)
also determines the investment level, dI/dωE N 0 follows. Differentiating
Eq. (A1) with respect to LE and ϕ I obtain
dLE
dϕ
¼ ωE þ LE
Q ′ ωE þ LE
 
− 1þ ϕð Þ b0;
where the inequality follows from Lemma A2. As Eq. (A1) also deter-
mines the investment level, dI/dϕ b 0 follows. □
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
I show the existence and the uniqueness of ωEc, ωcM , ω
c
M , and α^ and
proceed with the equilibrium outcomes.
Lemma A5. There exist unique thresholds ωEc(ϕ) N 0, ωcM α;ϕð Þ, ωcM
α;ϕð Þ, and α^ such that:
(i) Q ωE þ LE
 
−LE−ϕ ωE þ LE
  ¼ 0forωE = ωEc(ϕ) andωE þ LE ¼ I∗;
(ii) α Q ωE þ LE þωM þ LM
 
−LE−LM−ωM
 þ 1−αð ÞωE−ϕ ωEþð LEÞ ¼




ϕ ωM þ LM
  ¼ 0 forωM ¼ ωcM α;ϕð ÞandωE þ LE þωM þ LM ¼ I∗;
(iii) Q ωE þ LE þωM
 
−LE−ωM−ϕ ωE þ LE
  ¼ 0 forωM ¼ ωcM α;ϕð Þ
and ωE þ LE þωM ¼ I∗;
(iv) ωcM α;ϕð ÞNωcM α;ϕð ÞN0; and
(v) α^∈ 0;1ð Þ.
Proof. Part (i): The proof is provided in Lemma A3.
Part (ii): The thresholdωcM is the smallest wealth level that satisﬁes
ωE þ LE þωM þ LM ¼ I∗ when E and the moneylender (henceforthM) utilize bank funds as given by Eqs. (9) and (10) in the main
text. Using Eqs. (9) and (10) to solve for the maximum incentive-
compatible investment level I have that, for a given level of E's
wealth, ωE, ωcM satisﬁes
Q I
 
−I 1þ ϕð Þ þωE þωcM ¼ 0: ðA3Þ
The threshold is unique if both LE and LM are increasing inωM. Differ-
entiating Eqs. (9) and (10) with respect to LE , LM , and ωM using




α Q ′ Ið Þ−1
h i





ϕ Q ′ Ið Þ−ϕ
h i
−α Q ′ Ið Þ−1
h i
ϕ 1þ ϕ−Q ′ Ið Þ  N0;
where the inequalities follow from Lemma A2, Q′(I) ≥ 1, and ϕ b 1.
Part (iii): The thresholdωcM is the smallest wealth level that satisﬁes
ωE þ LE þωM ¼ I∗ at which M is able to self ﬁnance E. Thus, for a





−I 1þ ϕð Þ þωE þωcMϕ ¼ 0: ðA4Þ
The threshold is unique if LE (LM) is independent of (decreasing in)
ωM when the relevant constraints are given by Eq. (12) in the main
text and the ﬁrst-order condition Q′(I) − 1 = 0. Differentiating
Eq. (12) and the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to LE , LM, and








Part (iv): Combining Eqs. (A3) and (A4), yields ωcM ¼ ϕωcM , where
ωcM Nω
c
M follows fromϕ b 1. Finally,ωE
c N 0 is a result of the assump-
tion that ϕ N ϕ [Eq. (1)].
Part (v): Solving for α^ using Eq. (11) in the main text I have that
α^ ¼ Q ωE þ LE
 
−ωE−LE




By concavity and Q′(I) ≥ 1, the denominator always exceeds the
nominator in Eq. (A5). Hence, α^b1. Similarly, α^N0 follows from con-
cavity and Q′(I) ≥ 1. □
Lemma A6. If (i) ωE b ωEc and ωMbω
c
M then the entrepreneur borrows
from a bank and a bank-ﬁnancedmoneylender. If (ii)ωE b ωEc andωM≥
ωcM then the entrepreneur borrows from a bank and a self-ﬁnanced
moneylender. If (iii)ωE ≥ ωEc then the entrepreneur borrows exclusive-
ly from a bank.
Proof. I consider E's and M's incentive constraints given that the bank
breaks even. Five distinct cases need to be analyzed as E may borrow
170 A. Madestam / Journal of Development Economics 107 (2014) 157–174from: (i) the bank exclusively; (ii) the bank and a bank-ﬁnancedM; (iii)
a bank-ﬁnanced M exclusively; (iv) a self-ﬁnanced M exclusively; (v)
the bank and a self-ﬁnanced M.
Part (i): First, considerωMbωcM. Recognizing the concavity of Q(I) and
Q′(I) ≥ 1, it follows that E and M prefer Case (ii) to Cases (iii)–(v) for
anyα. Finally, forαN α^ as deﬁned in Eq. (A5), E prefers Case (ii) to Case




accounts for the in-
terval of credit lines such thatωM b I∗ − ωE − LE, for a given ωE and
ωE. From the main text we have that Case (ii) leaves E with the
full surplus, while M is indifferent and so Case (ii) remains the





Part (ii): Here, ωE + ωM accounts for the interval of credit lines such
that ωM ≥ I∗ − ωE − LE, for a given ωE and ωM. The only difference
from Part (ii) is that M refrains from bank borrowing when he is able
to self ﬁnance large parts of the ﬁrst-best investment, making Case
(ii) irrelevant. Thus, Case (v) is the only possible outcome since in
Cases (iii) and (iv), E would have to share part of a (possibly smaller)
surplus with M.
Part (iii): As E turns to the bank ﬁrst and is able to satisfy ﬁrst best,
Case (i) is the outcome. □
A.3. Proof of Corollary 1 (comparative statics)
Proof. ForωMbωcM , ωE b ωE
c, and αN α^: Differentiating Eqs. (9) and (10)





ϕ Q ′ Ið Þ−ϕ
h i
− 1−αð Þ Q ′ Ið Þ−1
h i




1−αð Þ Q ′ Ið Þ−1
h i










− ωM þ LM
 
α Q ′ Ið Þ−1
h i











− ωE þ LE
 
1−αð Þ Q ′ Ið Þ−1
h i
ϕ 1þ ϕ−Q ′ Ið Þ  b0;
where the inequalities follow from Lemma A2, Q′(I) ≥ 1, and ϕ b 1.
The proof that dLE=dωM≥0 and dLM=dωM N0 is provided in Lemma A5.




), ωE b ωEc, and αN α^: The relevant constraints are
given by Eq. (12) in the main text and the ﬁrst-order condition
Q′(I) − 1 = 0. Differentiating Eq. (12) and the ﬁrst-order condi-





















¼ ωE þ LE
ϕ
N0;
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from ϕ b 1. The proof that dLE=
dωM ¼ 0 and dLM/dωM b 0 is provided in Lemma A5. □A.4. Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 is proved in the main text, except for the compar-
ative static results and the existence and the uniqueness of ωmE and
ωmE .
Lemma A7. There exist unique thresholdsωmE ϕð Þ andωmE ϕð Þ such that:
(i) ϕ(ωE + LE) − Q(ωE) = 0 for ωE ¼ ωmE ϕð Þ and ωE + LE = I,
with the investment level given by Eq. (13) in the main text;
(ii) ϕ(ωE + LE) − Q(ωE) = 0 for ωE ¼ ωmE ϕð Þ and ωE + LE = I∗;
and
(iii) ωmE ϕð ÞNωmE ϕð ÞN0 and ωmE ϕð ÞNωcE ϕð Þ.
Proof. Part (i): The threshold ωmE is the smallest wealth level at which
E's incentive constraint equals her participation constraint allowing
E to invest ωE + LE = I, with I given by Eq. (13) in the main text.
Thus, ωmE satisﬁes
ϕI−Q ωmE
  ¼ 0: ðA6Þ
The threshold is unique if LE is decreasing inωEwhen the equilibrium
is given by Eqs. (13) and (14) in the main text. Differentiating





Finally, ωmE N0 follows from the assumption that ϕ N ϕ.
Part (ii): The proof is analogous to the proof of Part (ii) and omitted.
Part (iii): Solving forωmE andω
m
E and combining the two expressions,
yieldsQ ωmE
 
I0 ¼ Q ωmE
 
I∗, with I0 given by Eq. (13) in themain text.
By concavity, I∗ N I0 and hence ωmE Nω
m
E . Solving for ωE
c and ωmE and





E follows from concavity. □
Lemma A8. If ωE≤ωmE then LE decreases in ωE and I is independent of




then LE and I increase in ωE.
Proof. WhenωE≤ωmE , the proof that dLE/dωE b 0 is provided in Lemma
A7. Differentiating Eqs. (13) and (14) in the main text and the invest-









, the relevant constraints are given by Eq. (15) in
the main text, the binding participation constraint, Q(ωE + LE) −
DE = Q(ωE), and the investment condition, ωE + LE = I. Differenti-
ating Eq. (15), the binding participation constraint, and the invest-















where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Q′(I) ≥ 1 and ϕ b 1. □
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I show the existence and the uniqueness ofωEm,ωmM,ω
m
M, and eα and
proceed with the equilibrium outcomes.
Lemma A9. There exist unique thresholds ωEm(α,ϕ) N 0, ωMm(α,ϕ), ω
m
M
α;ϕð Þ, and eα such that:
(i) ϕ(ωE + LE) − αQ(ωE + B) − (1 − α)ωE + αB = 0 for
ωE = ωEm(α,ϕ) and ωE + LE + B = I, with the investment
level given by Eq. (18) in the main text;
(ii) ϕ(ωM + LM) − (1 − α)[Q(ωE + ωM) − ωE] − αωM = 0 for
ωM ¼ ωmM α;ϕð Þ and ωE + ωM + LM = I, with the investment
level given by Eq. (18) in the main text;
(iii) ϕ(ωM + LM) − (1 − α)[Q(ωE + ωM) − ωE] − αωM = 0 for
ωM ¼ ωmM α;ϕð Þ and ωE + ωM + LM = I*;
(iv) ωmM α;ϕð ÞNωmM α;ϕð ÞN0; and
(v) eα∈ 0;1ð Þ.
Proof. Part (i): The threshold ωEm is the smallest wealth level at which
E's incentive constraint equals her participation constraint allowing
E to invest ωE + LE + B = I, with I given by Eq. (18) in the main
text. Thus, for a given level of M's wealth, ωM, ωEm satisﬁes
ϕ I−Bð Þ−αQ ωmE þωM
 
− 1−αð ÞωmE þ αωM ¼ 0: ðA7Þ
The threshold is unique if LE + LM decrease in ωE when the equilib-
rium is given by Eqs. (16) to (18) in themain text. {The same reason-
ing applies when ωM∈ ωmM; I
−ωE
 
.} Differentiating Eqs. (16) to











with dLE/dωE + dLM/dωE = −1. To show ωEm N 0, let α ¼ eα in
Eq. (A7) where eα is given by Eq. (5) in the main text. This yields
ϕ(I − B) − Q(ωEm) = 0, where ωEm N 0 follows from the assumption
thatϕNϕ. Then letα = 1.Here,ϕ(I − B) − Q(ωEm + ωM) + ωM = 0.
Note that ωEm decreases in ωM for ωM b I∗ − ωE. As ωM approaches
I⁎− ωE, I have that ϕ(I∗ − ωM) − Q(I∗) + I∗ − ωEm = 0, which is
identical to Eq. (A4). If ωEm = 0 then ωM = I∗, but this contradicts
ωcMbI
∗. Hence, ωEm N 0.
Part (ii): The threshold ωMm is the smallest wealth level at which
M's incentive constraint equals his participation constraint
allowing an investment of ωE + ωM + LM = I, with I given by
Eq. (18) in the main text. Thus, for a given level of E's wealth,
ωE, ωmM satisﬁes




−αωmM ¼ 0: ðA8Þ
The threshold is unique if LE + LM decrease inωMwhen the equilib-
rium is given by Eqs. (16) to (18) in the main text. Differentiating











with dLE/dωM + dLM/dωM = −1.
Part (iii): The thresholdωmM is the smallest wealth level at whichM's
incentive constraint equals his participation constraint allowing an










−αωmM ¼ 0: ðA9Þ
The threshold is unique if LM is increasing in ωMwhen the equilibri-
um is given by Eqs. (19) and (20) in the main text. Differentiating





′ ωE þωMð Þ þ α−ϕ
ϕ
N0;
where the inequality follows from Q′(I) ≥ 1 and ϕ b 1.
Part (iv): Combining Eqs. (A8) and (A9), yields I′−ωE
 	
1−αð Þ×f





αωmMg, with I′ given by Eq. (18) in the main text, and hence ωmM NωmM .
Finally, ωmM N0 follows from the assumption that ϕ N ϕ.
Part (v): The proof is provided in themain text. □
LemmaA10. If (i)ωE b ωEm andωMbωmM then the entrepreneur borrows




) then the entrepreneur borrows exclusively from a bank-
ﬁnanced moneylender. If (iii) ωE b ωEm and ωM ≥ I∗ − ωE then the en-
trepreneur borrows from a bank and a self-ﬁnanced moneylender.
Proof. I consider the bank's utility given that the relevant (incentive or
participation) constraint of E and M is satisﬁed.
Part (i): There are two distinct cases to consider when ωE b ωEm
and ωMbωmM . First, if the incentive constraints of E and M bind,
the bank prefers lending to both rather than only one of them
as this minimizes the aggregate loan size needed to satisfy I′
[given by Eq. (18) in the main text]. When M's participation
and incentive constraint hold simultaneously, the bank can ei-
ther: (i) scale up the loan to E and M, allowing the investment
to rise above I′; or (ii) maintain I = I′ by reallocating the loan
from E to M in response to an increase in M's wealth. Suppose
Case (i) is a candidate equilibrium, as deﬁned by Eqs. (16) to
(18) in the main text. An increase in ωM allows the bank to
increase LM to the point at which M's incentive constraint
equals his participation constraint. M's additional loan raises E's
investment return and permits a larger loan to E as well. Hence,
an increase in M's wealth increases the bank's utility by (differen-
tiating UBank = Q(I) − (1 − α)[Q(ωE + ωM) − ωE] −αωM −









where Q′(I) b 1 + ϕ as I N I′. Meanwhile, Case (ii) implies that an
increase in ωM is met by an increase in LM and a subsequent de-
crease in LE satisfying dLM/dωM + dωM/dωM = − dLE/dωM.










Hence, when ωE b ωEm and ωMbωmM , E borrows from the bank and a
bank-ﬁnanced M with ωE + LE + ωM + LM = I′.
Part (ii):WhenωE b ωEm andωM ∈ [ωMm, I∗ − ωE) the only difference
from Part (i) is that M's debt capacity has improved, allowing the
bank to extend the entire loan to M as this saves the incentive rent
otherwise shared with E.
Part (iii):WhenωE b ωEm andωM ≥ I∗ − ωE, M is able to self ﬁnance
ﬁrst-best investment and the same outcome as described in Part (ii),
Lemma A6 is obtained. □
A.6. Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Differentiating the ratio of informal credit to investment, B/I, with
respect to ϕ, ωE, and ωM yields rϕ = [(dLM/dϕ)I − (dI/dϕ)B]/I2, rωE ¼
dLM=dωEð ÞI− dI=dωEð ÞB½ =I2, and rωM ¼ d ωM þ LMð Þ=dωM½ I− dI=ðf dωMÞBg=
I2, respectively. Investment is unaffected by variation in ϕ, ωE, and
ωM (ωE and ωM) at ﬁrst best (when it is given by Eq. (18) in the
main text).
Part (i): When ωE b ωEc and ωM≥ωcM , rϕ = (dLM/dϕ)/I N 0, rωE ¼
dLM=dωEð Þ=Ib0, and rωM ¼ 1þ dLM=dωMð Þ=I ¼ 0, using the comparative
statics established in Corollary 1.





), the constraints are given by Eqs. (19) and (20) in
the main text. Differentiating Eqs. (19) and (20) with respect to LM, I,
and ϕ using Cramer's rule I obtain dLM/dϕ = dI/dϕ = − B/ϕ b 0.
When ωE b ωEm and ωM∈ ωmM ; I∗−ωE
 
, the constraints are given by
Eq. (19) in themain text and theﬁrst-order conditionQ′(I) − 1 = 0.Dif-
ferentiating Eq. (19) and the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to LM, ωE,
and ωM using Cramer's rule I obtain dLM/dωE = dLM/dωM = −1. Next, I
determine the ratios. WhenωE b ωEm andωMbωmM, then rωE ¼ dLM=dωEð Þ
=Ib0 and rωM ¼ 1þ dLM=dωMð Þ=IN0 , using the comparative statics





rϕ = − BωE/ϕI2 b 0 and rωM ¼ 1−αð ÞQ ′ ωE þωMð Þ þ α
h i
×ωE=ϕI2N0,
using the comparative statics established above and in Lemma A9.
If ωE b ωEm and ωM∈ ωmM; I∗−ωE
 
, then rϕ ¼ rωM ¼ 0 and rωE ¼−1=Ib
0, using the comparative statics established above. □
A.7. Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. Part (i): When ωE b ωEc , ωMbωcM , and α= 1 the relevant con-
straints are given by Eqs. (9) and (10) in the main text. Differen-
tiating Eqs. (9) and (10) with respect to I, ωE, and ϕ using
Cramer's rule I obtain dI/dϕ = − ϕI/Θ and dI/dωE = ϕ/Θ, with
Θ = ϕ[1 + ϕ − Q′(I))] N 0, where the inequality follows from
Lemma A2. Using Corollary 1 and the derived comparative
statics, I have that rϕ = {[B(Q′(I) − (1 + ϕ))]I + BϕI}/ΘI2 =
B[Q′(I) −1]/ΘI N 0 and rωE ¼−ϕB=ΘI2b0, where the inequal-
ities follow from Q′(I) ≥ 1. When ωE b ωEc and ωM≥ωcM , the re-
sults are found in the proof of Proposition 5, Part (i).




, and α = 1, the relevant
constraints are given by Eqs. (19) and (20) in the main text. Differ-
entiating Eqs. (9) and (10) with respect to I, LM, and ωE using
Cramer's rule I obtain dI/dωE = 1 and dLM/dωE = 0. Using the de-
rived comparative statics I have that rωE ¼−Bb0. When ωE b ωEmand ωMbωmM or ωM≥ω
m
M , the results are found in the proof of
Proposition 5, Part (ii). □
Proof of Lemma 1. [As above, the competitive (monopoly) outcome is
denoted by superscript c (m).]
Proof. Part (i): There are two distinct cases to consider. First, whenωM
bωmM; I
cN Im follows from Lemma A2, Eq. (18) in the main text, and
concavity. Combining Eqs. (9) and (10) and Eqs. (16) and (17) in
themain text, yieldsQ(Ic) − Ic = ϕIc andQ(Im) − D = ϕIm, respec-
tively. Subtracting LEm from LEc using E's incentive constraints
given by Eqs. (9) and (16) yields α[Q(Ic) − Ic − (Q(Im) − D)] =




monopoly bank lending to E ceases, hence LEc N LEm = 0.
Part (ii): I begin by showing the existence and the uniqueness of










tinuity and Proposition 9, there exists a unique threshold
ωM ¼ ω^M α;ϕð Þ for ωM∈ ωcM ;ωcM
 
at which LMc = LMm. Having
established the existence and the uniqueness of ω^M , there are
four distinct cases to consider. First, when ωMbωmM , the proof is
analogous to the proof of Part (i) resulting in LMc N LMm. Second,
suppose LMm N LMc when ωM∈ ωmM ; ω^M
 
. This implies that ωmMbω
c
M ,
which contradicts Proposition 9 and so LMc N LMm. Third, when ωM
∈ ω^M ;ωcM
 
I have from Lemma A10 that LMm N LMc = 0. Fourth,
when ωM∈ ωcM ; I∗−ωE
 
, competitive bank lending to M ceases,
hence LMm N LMc = 0. □
A.8. Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. When ωM∈ ω^M ; I∗−ωEð Þ , Bm/Im − Bc/Ic = (BmIc − BcIm)/
ImIc N 0, since Bm N Bc from Lemma 1 and Ic ≥ Im. When ωMbω^M ,
Bm/Im − Bc/Ic is indeterminate, as Bm b Bc fromLemma1,while Ic N Im. □
Proof of Proposition 7. (Let UEi and UMi denote E's and M's respective
utility.)
Proof. Part (i): First, fromLemma1 Ihave that LEc N LEm. Hence, forωMbωmM,
UE




c = ϕ(ωE + LEc) N ϕ(ωE + LEm) N αQ(ωE + ωM) + (1 − α)ωE +
αωM = UEm. Next, when ωMbωcM , UM
c = ϕ(ωM + LMc ) N
ϕ(ωM +LMm)=UMm. WhenωM∈ ωcM; I
∗−ωE
 
, UMc = ωM b (1 − α) ×
[Q(ωE + ωM) − ωE] + αωM = UMm.
Part (ii): Denote isolation by UEmi and coexistence by UEmc. For ωMb
ωmM , UE
mi = ϕI′ N ϕ(I′ − ωM − LM) = UEmc [with I′ given by
Eq. (18) in the main text] and for ωM∈ ωmM; I
∗−ωE
 
, UEmi = ϕI′ N
ϕ(I∗ − ωM − LM) N αQ(ωE + ωM) + (1 − α)ωE − αωM = UEmc.□
A.9. Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Part (i): In the competitive benchmark when ωE b ωEc and ωMb
ωcM , I have that R
c/Bc − 1 = [ϕ(ωM + LM) − ωM]/(ωM + LM) N 0
using Eq. (10) in the main text, where the inequality follows from
ωMbωcM . In the monopoly case when ωE b ωE
m and ωMbωmM , R
m/
Bm − 1 = {(1 − α)[Q(I) − D − ωE − ωM] + DM − LM}/Bm N 0,
where the inequality follows from(1 − α)[Q(I) − D − ωE − ωM] =
ϕ(ωM + LM) − ωM N 0 [using Eq. (17) in the main text] while
DM − LM ≥ 0. When ωE b ωEm and ωM∈ ωmM ; I
∗−ωE
 
, Rm/Bm − 1 =
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ωM}/Bm using Eq. (19) in themain text to solve forDM. As the numer-
ator decreases in α, it sufﬁces to show that the numerator is positive
for α=1. Setting α=1 and applying themean-value theorem yields
Q(ωE + ωM + LM) − Q(ωE + ωM) − LM = LM[Q′(ξ) − 1] N 0,
where the inequality follows from Q′(I) ≥ 1 and concavity with
Q′(ξ) ∈ (Q′(ωE + ωM + LM), Q′(ωE + ωM)).




tive banking, Rc/Bc − 1 = 0 as α = 1. From part (i) above and
since ωcMbω
m
M [showed in the proofs of Lemmas A5 and A9 and




. □A.10. Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. Part (i): I start with ﬁnancial sector coexistence. Under compet-
itive banking, the relevant constraints are given by Eqs. (A2) and





E N0,where the last inequality follows from the assump-
tion that ϕ N ϕ. Under monopoly banking, two investment levels I′
[given by Eq. (18) in the main text] and I⁎ need to be veriﬁed.
Starting with I′ and combining Eqs. (A6) and (A7), yields Q ωmE
  ¼
αQ ωmE þ B
 þ 1−αð ÞωmE −αBþ ϕB. As the critical thresholdωEm de-
creases in α, it follows from concavity thatωmE Nω
m
E . The proof when
I = I⁎ is analogous and omitted. Next, I turn to bank market power.
First, note that ωmM as deﬁned by Eq. (A9) decreases in ωE. In partic-
ular, allow ωE to increase up to the point at which ϕ(ωE + LE) −
αQ(ωE + ωM) − (1 − α)ωE + αωM = 0 for ωE + LE + ωM = I*,
or ϕ(I∗ − ωM) − αQ(ωE + ωM) − (1 − α)ωE + αωM = 0. De-
note the critical ωM that satisﬁes this last equality by eωmM . From the
previous argument it follows that eωmMbωmM. Hence, to show thatωcMb
ωmM, it sufﬁces to verify that eωcMbωmM. Then, observe that eωmM decreases
in α. Hence, combining the expression for eωmM as deﬁned above with
the expression forωcM as given by Eq. (A4) and allowingα=1, yields
I∗ Q Ið Þ−½ I∗−Q ωE þ eωmM
 	




−eωmM Q I∗ð Þ−I∗ þωE½  ¼ 0. Let Q I∗ð Þ−I∗−Q ωE þ eωmM
 	
þωE þ eωmM ≡
Φ, where Φ N 0 by concavity and Q′(I) ≥ 1. Suppose ﬁrst that eωcM ¼
ωcM. This implies that I
∗−eωcM
 	
Φ ¼ 0. But this equality contradicts
I∗N eωmM and Φ N 0. Suppose then that eωmM ¼ ωcM þ ε . This yields
I∗−eωmM
 	




¼ 0, which again generates a
contradiction since Q ωε þ eωmM
 	
N eωmM . It follows that ωcMbeωmM , es-
tablishing the claim.
Part (ii): Opportunity cost of capital, ρ, enters multiplicatively
with respect to the credit lines, (1 + ρ)Li, and the wealth,
(1 + ρ)ωi, under competition. When ωE b ωEc and ωMbωcM , the
relevant constraints are given by Eqs. (9) and (10) in the main
text. Differentiating Eqs. (9) and (10) with respect to I and ρ using
Cramer's rule I obtain dI=dρ ¼−ϕ LE þ LM
 
= 1þ ρþ ϕ−Q ′ Ið Þ
 	
b0,
where the inequality follows from Lemma A2. When ωE b ωEc and
ωM NωcM , investment is determined by the ﬁrst-order condition
Q′(I) − (1 + ρ) = 0,with dI/dρ = 1/Q″(I) b 0,where the inequality
follows from concavity. Under monopoly, investment is determined
by Eq. (18) in the main text when ωE b ωEm and ωMbωmM . The
modiﬁed equation reads, Q′(I) − (1 + ρ + ϕ) = 0, with dI/
dρ = 1/Q″(I) b 0, where the inequality follows from concavity.




the relevant constraints are
given by Eqs. (19) and (20) in the main text. Here, ρ only affects
the return on the outside option, (1 + ρ)ωi. Differentiating
Eqs. (19) and (20)with respect to I and ρ using Cramer's rule I obtaindI/dρ = [αωM(1 − α)ωE]/ϕ. The derivative is positive if
α N α∗ = ωE/(ωE + ωM). As α∈ eα;1ð Þ, it sufﬁces to show that eα≥
α∗,where eα is given by Eq. (5) in themain text. Subtracting α* from α^
yields [Q(ωE)(ωE + ωM) − Q(ωE + ωM)ωE]/{[Q(ωE + ωM) − (ω-
E + ωM)](ωE + ωM)} N 0, where the inequality follows from
concavity. When ωE b ωEm and ωM≥ωmM , investment is deter-
mined by the ﬁrst-order condition Q′(I) − (1 + ρ) = 0, with
dI/dρ = 1/Q″(I) b 0, where the inequality follows from
concavity. □
A.11. Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. Part (i): When ωE b ωEc and ωMbωcM in the competitive
benchmark, the relevant constraints are given by Eqs. (9) and
(10) in the main text. Differentiating Eqs. (9) and (10) with re-
spect to I and ϕ using Cramer's rule I obtain dI/dϕ = − ϕI/
[1 + ρ +ϕ − Q′(I)] b 0, where the inequality follows from
Lemma A2 (ρ is included to enable a comparison). From the
proof of Proposition 9 I have that dI=dρ ¼−ϕ LE þ LM
 
=
1þ ρþ ϕ−Q ′ Ið Þ
h i
and so |dI/dϕ| N |dI/dρ|. Under monopoly,
investment is determined by Eq. (18) in the main text when
ωE b ωEm and ωMbωmM . The modiﬁed equation reads, Q′(I) −
(1 + ρ + ϕ) = 0, with dI/dϕ = dI/dρ = 1/Q″(I) b 0. When ωE b




, I have from the proof of Proposition 5 (9)
that dI/dϕ b 0(dI/dϕ N 0) and the conclusion follows.
Part (ii): WhenωE b ωEc andωMbωcM in the competitive benchmark,
the relevant constraints are given by Eqs. (9) and (10) in the main
text. Differentiating Eqs. (9) and (10) with respect to I, ωE, and ωM
setting dωM = −dωE using Cramer's rule I obtain dI/dωM = 0. At
ﬁrst best, variation in ωE and ωM has no effect on investment.
Under monopoly, investment is determined by Eq. (18) in the main
text when ωE b ωEm and ωMbωmM , with dI/dωM = 0. When ωE b ωE
m




, the relevant constraints are given by Eqs. (19)
and (20) in the main text. Differentiating Eqs. (19) and (20) with
respect to I, ωE, and ωM setting dωM = − dωE using Cramer's rule I
obtain dI/dωM = (1 − ϕ)/ϕ N 0, where the inequality follows
from ϕ b 1. At ﬁrst best, variation in ωE and ωM has no effect on
investment. □References
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